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INTRODUCTION
Patents are, in theory, a legal right to exclude competitors from
using the patentee’s invention. Exactly what the patentee gets to prevent others from using depends, however, on how the law defines the
scope of the patent right. In modern American patent doctrine, we
define what the patentee owns not by what she actually built or disclosed, but by what she claimed. Courts and commentators regularly
analogize patent claims as akin to the “metes and bounds” of a real
1
property deed, defining the outer boundaries of a “property” right
2
conferred on the patentee. According to this view, known as the peripheral claiming approach, words of a claim form a sort of conceptual
“fence” that marks the edge of the patentee’s rights. And for the last
dozen years, judges have had the responsibility of defining that periphery, interpreting the perimeter of patent claims in a pretrial pro3
ceeding known as a Markman hearing.
It isn’t working. Despite repeated efforts to set out the rules for
construing patent claims, culminating in the Federal Circuit’s en banc
4
Phillips decision in 2005, parties and courts seem unable to agree on
what particular patent claims mean. Patent law has provided none of
the certainty associated with the definition of boundaries in real
property law. Literally every case involves a fight over the meaning of
multiple terms, and not just the complex technical ones. Recent Federal Circuit cases have had to decide plausible disagreements over the
5
6
7
8
9
meanings of the words “a,” “or,” “to,” “including,” and “through,”

1

See, e.g., CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d
1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (drawing this analogy).
2
While patents are sometimes referred to as property rights, in fact they are not
property in the way we traditionally think of land or chattels. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK ch. 2 (2008) (discussing ways in which patents differ from traditional notions of property); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1036-37 (2005) (listing problems created by treating and
thinking about patents in the same manner as traditional property). But cf. Michael A.
Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004)
(arguing that real property doctrines can be used by analogy to limit intellectual property (IP)).
3
The procedure is named after Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370
(1996), in which the Supreme Court found that the interpretation of patent claims is a
matter of law to be decided by the judge.
4
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
5
See N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
6
See Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
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to name but a few. Claim construction is sufficiently uncertain that
many parties don’t settle a case until after the court has construed the
claims, because there is no baseline for agreement on what the patent
might possibly cover. Even after claim construction, the meaning of
the claims remains uncertain, not only because of the very real prospect of reversal on appeal but also because lawyers immediately begin
fighting about the meaning of the words used to construe the words
of the claims.
The problem is not just lack of understanding. Rather, claim construction may be inherently indeterminate: it may simply be impossi10
ble to cleanly map words to things. Patent attorneys seize on such
indeterminacy to excuse infringement or to expand their client’s exclusive rights. The Federal Circuit reworks patent claims that have already been construed by district court judges, and the patent system
increasingly revolves around the definition of terminology rather than
the substance of what the patentee invented and how significant that
invention really is. The key feature of peripheral claiming, setting out
clear boundaries to warn the public of what is and is not claimed—the
“notice function” of patents that has received so much attention in re11
12
cent years —increasingly seems to be an illusion. And it is a dan-

7

See Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
8
See Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1300-02 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
9
See Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1430-31 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
10
See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 259 (2008) (“[C]laim construction may be inherently indeterminate.”). As philosopher Bertrand Russell put it,
“[e]verything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise.” BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM 38 (David Pears ed.,
Open Court 1985). The Supreme Court recognized the problem in Festo, noting that
“[u]nfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of
a thing in a patent application.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
11
See, e.g., PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“One important purpose of the written description is to provide notice to the public as to the subject matter of the patent, while the claim provides notice
as to the scope of the invention.”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1429-30 (discussing how prosecution history estoppel helps to fulfill the public-notice function of patents). Long before the creation of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court itself emphasized the notice function, and expressed concern about a “zone of uncertainty
which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement
claims.” United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
12
Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer have colorfully characterized this problem in their
assertion that “if you can’t tell the boundaries, it ain’t property.” BESSEN & MEURER,
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gerous illusion, because it means that courts define the scope of legal
rights not by reference to the invention but by reference to semantic
debates over the meaning of words chosen by lawyers.
If patent-claim terms lack the virtue of certainty and are in fact doing mischief in the patent system, perhaps we should begin to rethink
the whole enterprise of peripheral claiming and the process of claim
construction that accompanies it.
There is an alternative. Before 1870, the scope of U.S. patents was
determined using a system of “central claiming.” Under a centralclaiming approach, the patentee does not delineate the outer reach of
what it claims. Rather, the patentee discloses the central features of
the invention—what distinguishes it from the prior art—and the
courts determine how much protection the patent is entitled to by
looking at the prior art that cabins the invention, how important the
13
patentee’s invention was, and how different the accused device is. In
14
some countries elements of that system remain to this day, and in15
deed there are vestiges of central claiming in the U.S. patent system.

supra note 2, at 8. Although this catch phrase captures a fundamental difference between patents and real property, as a matter of property theory it is at best incomplete;
we note the rather large body of legal and economic scholarship discussing the important benefits of vagueness in the boundaries of both real and intellectual property. See,
e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999); Jason
Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256
(1995); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
93 (2002); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 594
(1988); Michael Spence & Timothy Endicott, Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright, 121
L.Q. REV. 657, 661 (2005).
13
This is the now-moribund doctrine of “pioneer patents,” under which important
advances received broader protection than more modest improvements. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 207 (1894) (“If the invention is broad or primary in its character, the range of equivalents will be correspondingly broad, under
the liberal construction which the courts give to such inventions.”); Perkin-Elmer
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A pioneer
invention is entitled to a broad range of equivalents.”); John R. Thomas, The Question
Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 37 (1995). But see
Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (referring to the pioneer-patents rule as “ancient jurisprudence”), overruled on other grounds by
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
14
See TOSHIKO TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING PATENT CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES,
GERMANY AND JAPAN (1995) (describing Germany’s “central claiming” system).
15
For a discussion, see Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1273449.
Fromer correctly identifies design patents and means-plus-function claims as being
based in central claiming, although we are less persuaded by her characterization of
dependent claims and best-mode jurisprudence as elements of central claiming. In
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Central claiming is also the norm in U.S. copyright, trademark, and
trade secret law.
If the goal of peripheral claiming was to establish fence posts
marking the boundary of the patent, we can think of central claiming
16
as replacing fence posts with sign posts identifying new inventions.
Whereas peripheral claiming purports to mark the outermost boundary of the patentee’s claims, central claiming describes the core or gist
of the patentee’s contribution to technology. In this Article, we argue
that the way for the patent system to move ahead may be by looking
behind. Rather than relying on the illusion of peripheral fence posts,
patent law may do better to once again look to central sign posts.
Central claiming would be a radical change, and perhaps the
country is not ready to take such a step. Indeed, we are not ourselves
fully persuaded that the benefits of central claiming outweigh the
costs. But it is useful as a thought experiment, bringing our attention
back to the patentee’s invention rather than words written by lawyers.
Once we are willing to look beyond a pure peripheral-claiming system,
there are a number of smaller steps that courts could take to dethrone
the Markman hearing from its position of honor in patent litigation.
To begin, not every term in a patent claim needs to be construed or
fought over. We might reasonably limit claim construction to the explanation of technical terms that a jury is not likely to understand, restoring the original purpose of claim construction. We might also
limit claim construction to the point of novelty of the invention, to
prevent drafting ambiguities on collateral issues from rendering a
patent worthless. Second, we could pay more attention to the patentee’s actual description of the invention and less to the words of the
claims themselves in deciding the patent’s importance and coverage,
thus avoiding abuse of the litigation process by patentees who invent
one thing and later claim to own something else entirely. Third, we
could reinvigorate the doctrine of pioneer patents, restoring some vi17
tality to the doctrine of equivalents—which Markman killed —in the
subset of cases in which the defendant’s product in fact captures the
principle of the invention. Finally, we could make peripheral claims

addition, plant patents employ central claiming. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.163(c)(10) (allowing
only a single claim on an application for a plant patent).
16
We borrow this terminology from W. R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 165 (4th ed. 1999).
17
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007) (“The doctrine of equivalents was alive
and well before Markman, but has been in decline ever since.”).
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industry-specific, allowing patentees in industries like chemistry who
believe they can effectively define a genus to do so, but not limiting pat18
entees in less certain areas to the vagaries of patent-claim language.
We begin in Part I by examining in some detail the sorry state of
peripheral claiming, and in particular the failure of patent claims to
specify the scope of the rights granted to patentees. The picture we
paint will be familiar to anyone who is regularly engaged with the
modern U.S. patent system. We then review the features of central
claiming in Part II, including the development of claims themselves,
tracing the rise and decline of a system that was replaced, ironically, as
lacking the certainty that peripheral claiming was thought to provide.
In Part III, we discuss the benefits that might be recaptured by a move
back toward central claiming as well as the costs of such a move. We
also examine several hybrid measures that might be adopted, either in
the process of moving from fence-posting to sign-posting or as improvements over the current system that still stop short of fully adopting central claiming.
I. THE BREAKDOWN OF PERIPHERAL CLAIMING
The idea behind peripheral claiming, which U.S. patent law
adopted in the 1870s, was to establish the “metes and bounds” of the
invention in a manner analogous to real property deeds. But any
analogy between patent boundaries and real property boundaries is
19
no more than an analogy, and a flawed analogy at that. Those who
are intimate with the patent system have long understood that it is
simply impossible to define boundaries of invention with the physical
20
or descriptive precision of defining the boundaries of real property.

18

On the many industry-specific differences between these industries, see, for example, DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT (2009). While one possibility is to make claiming optional, giving the
option to the patentee rather than to, say, the courts, would solve only one side of the
problems with claim construction. A patentee who wanted to claim beyond the
bounds of the actual invention might choose to rely on peripheral rather than central
claiming.
19
Indeed, any analogy between real and intellectual property is fraught with peril.
See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1036-37.
20
See, e.g., RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS 41 (1949). Henry Smith suggests that
the definitional problems “are not fundamentally different from those . . . in property.” Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1795-99 (2007). As we delineate in this Section, that argument
is simply wrong. Cf. Michael A. Carrier, Why Modularity Does Not (and Should Not) Explain Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 95, 97 (2007)
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Even the boundaries of real property can shift, as when a boundary
river shifts its course. But boundaries based upon language lack the
social durability of surveying data or GPS coordinates—the stable,
21
agreed-upon criteria for positioning boundaries in space. This combination—semantic “boundaries” coupled with a metaphor that assumes definition and stability—has led to a situation in which the
metaphorical virtues of peripheral claiming obscure the actual damage it is doing to innovation.
A. The Process of Claim Construction
The peripheral-claiming system seeks to define the outer boundaries of the invention. In theory, the process works as follows: The applicant and the PTO examiner negotiate over the scope of the invention, limiting it in view of the prior art and the range of examples that
the applicant has enabled. The resulting claims define the scope of
the patent. Competitors can then read the patent claims and know
whether their actions will infringe the patent, and therefore whether
they need to avoid the patent or take a license. If they decide to infringe, the patentee sues, and courts determine validity and infringement by comparing those claims to the prior art or the defendant’s
product, respectively.
Every stage of this theoretical story depends critically on the ability
of participants in the process—patentees, examiners, competitors,
judges, and juries—to understand what the patent claims cover. Further, at several critical points, the story depends on different parties
(applicant and examiner, patentee and competitor) having a shared
understanding of the meaning of the patent claims. If the applicant
and the examiner agree that a patent should issue, but disagree about
what the patent actually means, something is wrong. Similarly, if a
competitor thinks that a patent means one thing and the patentee
thinks it means something different, they are unlikely to be able to
conclude a licensing transaction efficiently.

http://thepocketpart.org/2007/10/10/carrier.html (rejecting Smith’s assertion:
“boundaries are not as lucid in IP”).
21
Indeed, ironically, while GPS technology may give us clear boundaries in the
real world, courts have been unable to agree over the meaning of GPS coordinate systems in patent law. Compare Vehicle IP, LLC v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 2008-1259, slip
op. at 3-7 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2009), with id. at 1-2 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (disputing the
meaning of the word “coordinates” in a vehicle navigation system).
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In fact, disagreements over the meanings of patent claims are
pandemic. Lawyers are paid to interpret language—whether in statutes, contracts, or patent claims—in ways that serve their clients’ interests. And they are, as a general matter, quite good at it. Before
1995, disputes over what the patent covered were folded into general
disputes about patent validity and infringement. Those disputes ultimately went to the jury, which presumably made an implicit determination of claim scope in finding the patent valid or not and infringed
or not. Judges periodically determined the meaning of patent claims,
usually in the context of bench trials or summary judgment motions
requiring resolution of a claim-construction dispute. But claim construction before 1995 was not a separate inquiry in a patent case. It
was a part of the overall determination of either validity or infringement.
That changed in 1995 with the Federal Circuit’s Markman deci22
sion, affirmed by the Supreme Court the following year. In Markman, the Court held that the construction of patent documents, like
the construction of other legal documents, was to be done as a matter
23
of law by judges, not juries. The result was the so-called “Markman
hearing,” a pretrial proceeding in which judges hear argument on the
meaning of disputed patent claims, sometimes hear evidence, and issue a written ruling defining the words of the claims in other, theoretically more precise, words. Courts are to construe patent claims
based on some combination of their “plain meaning,” the description
of the invention in the specification, the prosecution history of the
patent, technical treatises and dictionaries, expert testimony, and a se24
ries of legal canons of claim interpretation. Virtually every judge in
the country conducts Markman hearings sooner or later in the trial
process, though a few judges defer claim construction until shortly be25
fore trial when jury instructions are written.

22

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
23
Id. at 388.
24
See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313-24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 263-68 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) (discussing canons of claim construction).
25
This is common in the District of Delaware, for instance.
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B. Disputes over the Meaning of Patent Claims
The creation of the Markman hearing has made the process of peripheral claiming more transparent. Because judges now hold hearings on claim-construction disputes and have to issue written rulings
interpreting disputed claims, the nature and extent of those disputes
is now clearer than it was before 1995. And the results are quite
alarming. First, there is essentially always a dispute over the meaning
of the patent claims. Patent suits normally include Markman hearings,
26
and every district that has local patent rules provides for them. Indeed, there is rarely just one dispute in a patent claim; patent lawsuits
27
frequently involve fights over ten or more claim terms. The Federal
Circuit has held that courts must resolve every dispute over the scope
of the patent claims as a matter of claim construction, issuing a written
ruling that “interprets” even simple patent claim terms that jurors can
28
understand. And district court judges regularly issue orders limiting
Markman hearings to only ten or so claim terms. Without demanding
agreement from the parties, judges might well face arguments over
the meaning of every word in a patent claim.
These disputes turn out to be surprisingly hard to resolve. Even
after a district court issues its claim-construction order, the meaning
of the claims is uncertain. The Federal Circuit reverses more than
one-third of the claim-construction cases presented to it on appeal, a
29
far larger percentage than its general reversal rate. These reversals
aren’t just a problem of lack of education; David Schwartz has found
that the most experienced district court judges and ITC administrative
law judges who specialize in patents have their claim-construction de26

See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PAT. L.R., available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ (follow
“Rules” hyperlink on left menu; then follow “Patent Local Rules 3/1/2008” hyperlink).
27
See, e.g., ChriMar Sys., Inc. v. PowerDsine, Ltd., No. 01-74081, 2008 WL 2966470
(E.D. Mich. July 30, 2008) (construing thirteen terms in one order). To the extent
that it is relevant, Professor Lemley serves as the special master in this case.
28
See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360-62
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
29
The definitive study is Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to
Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 fig.2, 15 tbl.1 (2001); see also Christian
A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1075, 1089-90, 1096-1107 (2001) (finding a reversal rate between 29% and
38%, depending on the period examined). More recent work by Judge Moore suggests that the reversal rate is increasing, not decreasing, over time. Kimberly A. Moore,
Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 231, 246 fig. (2005) (finding a reversal rate of around forty percent); cf. Schwartz,
supra note 10, at 267-68 (finding data consistent with Judge Moore’s in a study directed
at learning effects among district judges).
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cisions reversed just as often as district judges without patent experi30
ence. And despite agreement by the Federal Circuit in Phillips on
the criteria for interpreting patent claims, Federal Circuit judges cannot agree on how to apply those criteria: the rate of dissents in claim31
construction appeals tripled after Phillips was decided, and the over32
all reversal rate remained high. In short, claim-construction disputes
aren’t just make-work; they seem harder for courts to resolve consistently than other types of patent disputes.
Why are there so many disputes over the meaning of patent-claim
terms? One possibility is that patents cover new scientific terminology
that doesn’t have a fixed meaning in the art, so that scientists in the
field can reasonably disagree over the meaning of those terms. No
doubt this does happen from time to time. But it is by no means a full
or even primary explanation for claim-construction disputes. At least
four more structural problems make certainty in patent boundarydrawing unlikely.
First, lawyers are paid to create, identify, and exploit ambiguities
33
in language. And lawyers are good at their jobs. The problem begins with the patent applicant. Many claim-construction disputes are
over the meaning of terms that are well understood in the art, but
which are insufficiently specified in the claim itself. Biotechnologists
understand what a “monoclonal antibody” is, but, depending on context, the universe of things that they would include in that term may
range from the narrow (only IgM mouse-derived antibodies, say) to
the broad (any antibody, including chimeric and humanized antibod-

30

See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 30, on file with
authors) (suggesting that the reason experienced judges can’t get claim construction
right may be “that claim construction is indeterminate”); Schwartz, supra note 10, at
267-68.
31
R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence 24 (Mar. 30, 2008); see also
R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111-13 (2004) (suggesting that
agreement on the interpretive tools of claim construction masks methodological differences in the act of interpretation).
32
See Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215, 236 (2007) (finding a claim-construction reversal rate of 39.5% after Phillips). Notably, Saunders’s study excludes Rule 36 affirmances, and so should
bias the reversal rate upwards.
33
Cf. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting the “highly developed”
art of writing patents that actually disclose very little).
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34

ies). The applicant has the power to define the patent claims, but
many applicants don’t specify what they mean by ambiguous technical
language, either because they don’t think about the issue or because
they intend to exploit the ambiguity in obtaining or enforcing the
patent.
Even if the patentee is not being deliberately ambiguous, a dozen
years of Markman hearings have made it clear beyond doubt that litigators can and will find ambiguity in claim language. Some arguments over the meaning of claims may be frivolous, but it is surprising
how many disputes present legitimate questions of context. This is
true not only of technical terms—what does “monoclonal antibody”
cover—but simple terms as well. Everyone knows what the word “a”
35
means—but does it mean “one and only one,” or “one or more?”
Depending on the context, either is plausible. And Federal Circuit
decisions have given the same term different meanings in different
36
cases. Similarly, A “or” B can mean either “any of A, B, A + B” or “any
37
of A, B, but not A + B.” Lawyers regularly fight over the meaning of
many terms in each patent claim, and those fights are often surprisingly hard to resolve merely on the “plain meaning” of the language.
Language, it turns out, doesn’t have “a” plain meaning—unless of
38
course, “a” means “one or more.”
The problem is sometimes complicated by the very legal rules that
courts have created to help us resolve those ambiguities. Some of
those rules—such as the rule that courts can look to the specification
to understand the meaning of claim terms but not to read in addi39
tional limitations —make sense as a matter of theory. In practice,
however, the line is difficult to draw, and the fact that courts draw it
leads lawyers to interpret terms creatively in order to warrant resorting
to the specification. Similarly, the doctrine of claim differentiation,
which provides that different claims should be interpreted to cover
different things, makes sense in theory. In practice, however, lawyers
34

See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (discussing the scope of possible definitions for “monoclonal antibodies”).
35
Compare the meaning of “a” in the expressions “I want a job” and “I want a
birthday present.”
36
Forgive the expression.
37
Compare the meaning of “or” in the expressions “I will vote for Obama or
McCain” and “it will rain or snow today.”
38
See, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 296 (1990)
(“[M]eaning does not reside simply in the words of a text, for the words are always
pointing to something outside.”).
39
See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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who are aware of the doctrine sometimes pick different words that
mean the same thing, relying on the doctrine of claim differentiation
40
to force courts to give those terms different meanings.
The legal rule that most complicates the process is the Federal
Circuit’s recent decision that every dispute over patent scope must be
resolved as a matter of claim construction. In O2 Micro, the Federal
Circuit confronted a simple English word with an established meaning, but the parties disagreed as to whether it applied to the defendant’s product. The court held that whenever there is a dispute over
what a claim covers, the ambiguity must be resolved as a matter of
claim construction because it represents an uncertainty in the mean41
ing of patent claims. After O2 Micro, courts have no power to limit
the scope of claim construction by passing the dispute to the jury, no
42
matter how unambiguous the language of the claim might seem.
The problem is more structural than just the ability of lawyers to
exploit the ambiguity of language, however. A second fundamental
problem with certainty in claim construction is the ambiguity of audience. Put briefly, the issue is this: are patent claims to be interpreted
as they would be understood by the patentee or by the person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)? Patent law points in inconsistent
directions on this question. On the one hand, much of patent doctrine is directed to determining what the PHOSITA would understand—about the claimed invention, about the prior art, about the
43
teachings of the specification. In claim construction, the focus on
44
“plain meaning” and the occasional resort to dictionaries or treatises

40

See Mark A. Lemley, The Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1389, 1394-95 (2007).
41
O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360-62
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
42
But cf. IP Cleaning S.p.A. v. Annovi Reverberi, S.p.A., No. 08-0147, slip op. at 2-3
(W.D. Wis. Dec. 3, 2008) (requiring evidence that the claim dispute is relevant to validity or infringement, in order to avoid issuing an advisory opinion).
43
See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007) (emphasizing
the abilities of the PHOSITA in obviousness); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting the importance of the
PHOSITA in enablement); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1185-96 (2002) (discussing the role that
the PHOSITA plays in various patent doctrines).
44
See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“[D]ictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist
the court in [claim construction].”). Texas Digital was substantially limited in this respect by Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The use of
dictionaries or other “plain meaning” raises significant problems of hermeneutics;
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suggest that it is the reader whose understanding of the claim matters.
On the other hand, various aspects of claim construction, such as the
45
rule that the patentee is free to define her own claim terms, the focus on examples disclosed and particularly on the language chosen in
46
the specification, and the occasional reliance on prosecution history
47
as evidence of the meaning of patent claims, seem to suggest that the
goal of claim construction is to discern what the patentee intended
the invention to cover. And some claim-construction rules do not focus on either the inventor or the PHOSITA, but rather ask what a patent lawyer would understand the claims to mean. How else to understand, for instance, the distinction that the courts draw between
48
“comprising” and “consisting of”? The fiction that claim construction is a question of legal interpretation for judges, not an exercise in
49
understanding technology that depends on the facts, is part and par-

there is no guarantee that the dictionary or common definition of a term necessarily
reflects the intent of the inventor, let alone what the inventor conceived.
45
See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
46
See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Indeed, patentees who cite only a single example or examples that all fit into one category in a specification may find that their
claims are limited to that category. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1336-38 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
47
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317; Astrazeneca AB, Inc. v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 384
F.3d 1333, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
48
“Comprising” means that the patented invention contains at least the elements
listed, but may also contain others; “consisting of” means that the invention contains
only those elements listed. See, e.g., KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
There are other examples of claim construction based on a lawyer’s understanding. For instance, the Federal Circuit’s definition of “a” owes more to the rule of patent law that a claim that uses the term “comprising” is open (and so is infringed by any
product that includes the patented elements even if it also includes other things not
listed in the patent) than it does to any PHOSITA’s understanding of the term “a” in
context. See id.; Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“[O]ur cases emphasize that ‘a’ or ‘an’ can mean ‘one’ or ‘more than one,’ depending on the context in which the article is used.”). Judicial interpretation of weaselword claim terms such as “about” also seem to owe more to a legal interest in defining
claim scope than the way in which any particular PHOSITA would understand those
words. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1369-72 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (holding that the term “about” should “be given its ordinary meaning of
‘approximately’”); BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 338 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (agreeing that a jury should be instructed to give “about” its plain and
ordinary meaning).
49
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (holding that claim construction is an issue of law for judges to decide). For
strident criticism of that rule, see Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330-35 (Mayer, J., dissenting),
which notes that “[w]hile this court may persist in the delusion that claim construction
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cel of the problem. The courts have not grappled adequately with the
question of who is to understand the claim terms. It should not be
surprising that we will have difficulty in defining terms clearly if we
don’t know whose understanding of the claims matters, particularly
since the person doing the defining is neither inventor nor PHOSITA
nor even patent lawyer.
Third, even if we know the audience for claim terms, we have no
coherent standards for deciding into what chunks claim language
should be broken. To infringe, a defendant’s product must include
50
each and every “element” of the patented claim. As we have explained elsewhere, the scope of a patent will often depend on whether
an “element” is a single word in the claim, a phrase in the claim, or a
fifty-word chunk of the claim:
Determining the meaning of patent claims necessarily requires a judge
to break the text of a claim into discrete “elements” or units of text corresponding to the elements or units that comprise the claimed invention, essentially organizing the language of the claims into “chunks” or
“quanta” of text. Define an element narrowly—limit it to a single word,
say—and you will tend to narrow the resulting patent. By contrast, defining an element broadly tends to broaden the patent.
For each discrete packet identified, the courts must determine the
meaning of the constituent words. They can assign those words definitions that range from narrow, specific meanings to broad, general meanings. In determining the meaning of terms within a particular element,
judges practicing patent claim interpretation are engaged in an exercise
that to some degree resembles the famous “levels of abstraction test” articulated by Judge Learned Hand for analysis of infringement under
copyright law’s “idea/expression” doctrine.
There are no hard and fast standards in the law by which to make the
“right” decision as to either the size of the textual element or the level of
abstraction at which it will be evaluated. Indeed, the indeterminacy is so
acute that courts generally don’t even acknowledge that they are engaging in either inquiry. They define an element almost arbitrarily, and
even when judges disagree as to the proper definition they offer no
51
principled basis for doing so.

is a purely legal determination, unaffected by underlying facts, it is plainly not the
case.” That issue may still be revisited by the Federal Circuit en banc. See Amgen Inc.
v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
50
See, e.g., Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
51
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 29, 29-30 (2005) (italics omitted).
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Fourth, even if we could overcome all of these problems, any effort to define a claim term necessarily requires that we fix the meaning of that term in time. Words change in meaning, sometimes slowly
52
as language evolves, but sometimes with surprising rapidity. (If you
don’t believe us, ping someone from two decades ago and ask them to
Google the question of language evolution and forward the results to
you.) Change in the meaning of language is particularly likely in the
case of innovation, since the terms in question are often new and the
concepts they represent are not yet fully understood. In Chiron Corp.
v. Genentech, Inc., for instance, the court faced the issue of whether
“monoclonal antibody” should be given its 1984 meaning or its very
53
different 1999 meaning. And, in SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., the court had to decide whether the claim phrase “regularly received television signal,” written in 1985, covered digital television signals that did not exist at that time but were common by the
54
time of infringement.
The problem is that patent law asks different questions as of different times. It tests novelty and nonobviousness at the time that the
invention was made, enablement and written description as of the filing date, the meaning of means-plus-function patent claims as of the
date the patent issues, and infringement as of the date of infringe55
ment. The knowledge of those of skill in the art evolves between
those dates, which can be separated by decades. That means that,
strictly speaking, patent law shouldn’t be giving claim terms one meaning, but different meanings for different purposes. This is an issue
56
that has been almost entirely ignored in claim construction. It further undermines the idea that a “fence post” system of peripheral
claiming can create certainty by defining the scope of the invention in
a static way. It can’t, at least not without modifying many of the fun57
damental precepts of patent law.

52

See, e.g., Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 116, 147-48
(1863) (resolving a dispute over whether the term “bridge” as used in a 1790 statute
encompassed railroad bridges not contemplated at the time of enactment).
53
363 F.3d 1247, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For detailed discussion of this issue, see
Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 105,
117 (2005).
54
358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-06
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
55
See Lemley, supra note 53, at 105-10 (citing cases).
56
See id. at 116.
57
In an article on this issue, one of us took the position that peripheral-claim construction required collapsing these date dichotomies. Id. at 117-25. While that is true,
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Fifth, a significant puzzle of modern claim construction is the
asymmetrical treatment of patent claims and prior art references. Patent courts have developed elaborate rules for construing patent claims,
including a variety of canons of construction and hierarchies for reliance upon supporting documents such as prosecution histories and
58
dictionaries. But patent law includes no such rules for interpreting
the prior art against which claims are measured, despite the fact that
references surely do not interpret themselves and must be parsed under
59
some set of expectations, even if those expectations go unarticulated.
In some instances, there may be no explicit interpretive schema
for prior art references because the references are not documents.
We have observed elsewhere that patent infringement analysis requires the interpreter to map textual claims onto objects or processes
60
The Federal Circuit has spoken of literal inin the real world.
fringement occurring when the accused device reads “word-for-word”
61
on the patent claim, but the words are all on one side of that comparison; there are no words in the accused device to map onto the
words of the claim. Certainly physical objects and processes must be
“interpreted” at some level; the mind has some neurological and intellectual heuristic for perceiving objects in a meaningful way and comparing those perceptions to the claim text. But law remains a largely
textual enterprise, and there are (as yet) no explicit legal canons for
62
constructing the meanings of objects. Those interpretive processes
remain implicit and opaque.

the fact that peripheral claiming requires that modification, and the fact that courts
have not yet grappled with that issue demonstrates some of the uncertainty inherent in
peripheral claiming.
58
See supra Section I.B.
59
It is true that we care about prior-art references for different reasons than we
care about patent claims. We read a prior-art reference for everything that it teaches,
while we limit patent claims to what the inventor actually possessed at the time of invention. But the fact that we should construe prior-art references differently than we
do claims for some purposes doesn’t explain why we don’t seem to construe them at
all.
60
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 51, at 36. This naturally also occurs in some
other areas of law, such as determining whether a contractual provision is satisfied by
the goods delivered. See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F.
Supp. 116, 118-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (parsing the meaning of the word “chicken”).
61
See, e.g., Sri Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
62
See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 533
(1992) (“The format of the printed text enframes the process of creating and identifying the legal reality . . . .”).
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At the same time, not all claim construction occurs in the context
of infringement. Claims are also construed in the context of invalidity, against the prior art. Some prior art references do constitute actual devices or practices, such as anticipatory prior art known or used
63
in the United States before the date of invention. But most references will be textual, and even those that are not textual must typically
64
be reduced to a text before they can be evaluated by a court. For
that matter, even infringement analysis can require evaluation of textual prior art—for example, to determine whether a range of equiva65
lents is precluded by the prior art or by foreseeable technologies.
Thus, patent law frequently requires the mapping of text onto
text, construing claims against the prior art references. Courts ask
whether every element in a patent claim is found in an anticipatory
reference but have no explicit method for determining how to parse
the prior-art text to determine the presence of the invention’s elements. Indeed, under the statutory-bar provisions of section 102(b),
the standard is one of substantial similarity—a classic statement of
66
central-claiming analysis. Where obviousness is concerned, courts
measure the claimed invention against the knowledge of the person
67
having ordinary skill in the art—the PHOSITA. The PHOSITA is in
some sense a composite of relevant prior-art references as of the date
of invention. But again, there are no explicit interpretive rules to determine how such prior art is to be read, either individually or in the
aggregate. The result is that while we construe patent claims, theoretically providing certainty in meaning, we proceed to undermine
that certainty in the subset of cases that involve comparing those
claims not to devices but to other, unconstrued documents.

63

35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1031 (2008).
65
See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
683-85 (Fed. Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
66
See, e.g., Dix-Seal Corp. v. New Haven Trap Rock Co., 236 F. Supp. 914, 919
(D. Conn. 1964); see also In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (holding that
there need not be precise identity between the claimed invention and 102(b) prior-art
reference). To be sure, this seems to be an effort to ensure that section 102(b) prior
art fits within the obviousness framework despite the literal language of section 103,
which refers to obviousness “at the time the invention was made,” not after that time.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
67
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
64
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Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, is the problem of what
we might call metaconstruction. Peripheral claiming presumes that
the claims set out boundaries. The process of claim construction itself
presumes that the words of the claims are insufficiently precise to delineate those boundaries. The solution that claim construction offers
is to substitute theoretically clearer words for the unclear words of the
patent claim. But what happens when—as seems inevitable—the parties dispute the meaning of those new words? We should be skeptical
that the substitution of litigation-driven claim constructions for
equally well-understood terms that were not written with particular
litigation in mind will advance the understanding or clarity of patent
scope. It may end up resolving particular cases—indeed, it normally
will, at least if the lawyers advocating those claim constructions are
good at their jobs—but there is no reason to think these other words
will be less ambiguous or more likely to help a jury.
How great these problems are depends, to a large extent, on the
industry in which the patent exists. A patent claim that covers a DNA
sequence—a list of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs—is perfectly clear to a biotech68
nologist. Similarly, a chemical formula is perfectly clear to a chemist.
By contrast, we have a much harder time defining machines in words,
and a still harder time writing words that clearly delineate the scope of
69
software inventions. Not surprisingly, therefore, disputed claim constructions are more likely in the latter sorts of industries. Similarly,
David Schwartz has found significant differences in the claim70
construction reversal rates in different industries, suggesting that
resolution of those disputes is also harder in some industries than it is
in others. Our point is not that no one can ever understand patent
claims. Rather, it is that, in the industries that account for the over71
whelming majority of patents, figuring out the boundaries of a peripheral claim is difficult, if not impossible. And it is certainly not
something on which the relevant audiences—patentees, examiners,
competitors, and judges—can often agree.

68

An exception involves “weasel words”—terms like “about” or “substantially” that
vary the scope of a genus.
69
This is just one of the many industry-specific characteristics of the patent system.
For a broader discussion, see BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 18.
70
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 260-61.
71
In this decade, organic chemistry and biotechnology patents account for only
four percent of applications filed. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Essay, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 195 tbl.7 (2008).
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The problem is compounded by a drift in the use of patent claim
construction. Before Markman, even in what was nominally a peripheral claiming system, the focus was on arguing infringement and validity to the jury. Claim construction occurred, if at all, primarily in the
context of explaining the meaning of patent terms to the jury. As a
result, it was more likely to be focused on how the PHOSITA would
understand technical terms, not on legal argument over the impact of
72
nontechnical terms. Once Markman removed the process from the
73
jury, and particularly once the Federal Circuit made it clear that all
disputes over patent scope must be resolved in the claim-construction
74
process, that focus was lost. The result was to expand the domain of
the uncertainties that we have discussed in this Section, worsening the
perils of claim construction by adding to their reach.
C. The Costs of Claim Construction
If our only point were that claim construction is difficult, and that
courts are unlikely to get it right in all cases, the reader might fairly
respond that life (and litigation) is uncertain, and that the inability to
make decisions perfectly is no reason not to make them at all. Law relies on language, and interpreting language—the language of contracts, the language of statutes, the language of constitutions—is what
courts do. Why would we expect the interpretation of patent claims to
be any different?
But the interpretation of patent claims, we think, is different:
first, because of the custom of peripheral claiming; second, because of
the procedural and substantive peculiarity of the Markman hearing;
and third, because of the relationship between the process of claim
construction and the particular goals of the patent system. Construing claims is not like interpreting a contract or a statute: the focus on
claim construction that peripheral claiming, and Markman in particular, brings to the interpretive exercise imposes significant and peculiar
costs on patentees, defendants, and innovation as a whole.
First, and most obviously, the claim-construction process raises the
cost of litigation. Markman hearings themselves are expensive, requir-

72

According to a February 12, 2009, Westlaw search, the Federal Circuit has referred to “claim construction” 1407 times in its twenty-seven-year history. Of those references, 141 occurred before 1995 and 1266 occurred in 1995 or later.
73
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
74
See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360-62
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
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ing legal briefing, argument, and often witnesses and discovery. But
their litigation costs are not just direct. Parties often wait until after a
Markman ruling to settle a case because they don’t have a clear sense
of the scope of their patent until the district court defines the patent
claims. As a result, districts that do not hold Markman hearings, or
that issue their rulings very late in the process, tend to have more pat75
ent trials and later settlements. And the prospect of appellate reversal may keep the parties litigating even after the Markman ruling.
The litigation cost associated with claim construction is the least
significant problem that Markman causes. Far more significant is that
legal interpretation of words has taken the place of a definition of the
proper scope of the invention itself. Markman sidetracks us into battles over the meaning of words that were used in the first instance to
try to define the invention, and then (in metaconstruction) into battles over the meaning of other words defining the words that were
supposed to define the invention in the first place. It should be no
surprise that the result of this collateral process bears only a coincidental relationship to the ideal scope of the patent claim. After
Markman, we’re not often litigating what the inventor did or what her
patent should cover, because we are too concerned with what the lawyers did to define what the invention should cover. We have, in other
words, taken our eyes off of the ball.
The shift in focus from the invention to the claim language allows
both sides to game the process. It permits—and indeed even encourages—overclaiming by patentees, particularly patentees drafting or interpreting claims years after the invention itself. If the focus is on the
language of my claims, not the product that I actually built or described, I can interpret that language creatively to claim, in retrospect,
to own inventions that I didn’t have in mind when I wrote the patent
claims. In case after case, patentees claim to have invented electronic
commerce, or multimedia, or video-on-demand, voice-over-Internet,
or call centers, or any of a hundred other successful technologies. If
the patent lawsuit were focused on the central features of what the
patentee invented, overclaiming wouldn’t work. But if the focus is on
the words of the patent claims, then patent drafters can deliberately
introduce ambiguity and patent litigators can exploit both deliberate
and accidental ambiguities. Overclaiming may or may not help the

75

See Mark A. Lemley & Josh Walker, Does Markman Drive Settlements? Trial
Rates in Patent Cases Across Districts (vaporware 2009).
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patentee; the risk is that a claim that is too broad will be held invalid.
But the threat that the patent will be broadly construed will often be
enough to prompt a settlement.
The inherent ambiguity of claim construction does not always
benefit patentees. Individual ambiguities can just as easily be interpreted against the patentee as for her. In fact, the collective effect of
claim construction may systematically work to disadvantage patentees.
A clever defendant will interpret individual claim terms in ways that
render the claim either invalid or not infringed. If a defendant makes
ten such claim-construction arguments, the patentee may have to win
every one in order for the claim to survive. So the more terms a court
77
construes, the more bites at the apple defendants get. And because
claim drafting is, as we have seen, inherently imprecise, any one mistake can be fatal.
The doctrine of equivalents exists to correct just this sort of error
in claim drafting, permitting the patentee to expand the scope of her
claim to cover a defendant’s product that differs from the patented
78
invention in only a minor respect. But that leads us to a final problem with peripheral claiming: it has effectively spelled the end of the
doctrine of equivalents. The operation of the doctrine of equivalents
is effectively a form of central claiming; taking the literal claim construction as the central invention, the doctrine then asks whether the
accused device appropriates the “gist” of the literal claims by adopting
a substitution known in the art, or uses an alternative element that accomplishes the same function in the same way to achieve the same result. But it is harder to apply this doctrine to a nominally peripheral
claim because we are no longer focused on the heart of the invention.
Courts are aware that the text of the claims is supposed to represent
the outermost boundaries of the inventor’s rights, and they are anxious not to expand the claims through the doctrine of equivalents.
This tension between peripheral claiming and the doctrine of equivalents leads, first, to impossible, almost mystical, judicial pronounce76

In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 908 (Fed. Cir. 2004), for instance, the Federal Circuit accepted the patentee’s claim-construction argument that
its claims were not limited to the invention disclosed in the specification. But on remand, the district court held the broadened claims invalid, No. 98-0858 2005 WL
2840744 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2005), and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the
claims were not enabled when construed that broadly. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.
Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
77
To be fair, the patentee has multiple bites at the apple too, since she files multiple claims in each patent and often obtains a family of patents.
78
See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).

1764

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 1743

ments about the doctrine of equivalents. For example, the Federal
Circuit has held that the doctrine of equivalents does not expand the
scope of the claims, only the inventor’s right to exclude, and gives the
inventor no more than she would have had under a properly drafted
79
literal claim. Second, this tension leads to expansion of the patent
claims under the rubric of literal interpretation; rather than finding
infringement by equivalents, interpretive sleight of hand is used to
stretch the claims text to cover similar accused devices.
As a result, peripheral claiming has eroded the doctrine of equivalents to the point where it is no longer a significant part of patent law.
John Allison and Mark Lemley found that patent plaintiffs almost
80
never win doctrine of equivalents cases after Markman. They trace
the death of the doctrine to Markman itself, because district courts
that construe claims and then decide literal infringement on summary
judgment are unwilling to undo the work of claim construction by al81
lowing the patentee to argue the doctrine of equivalents. The result
is that Markman has not only set traps for patentees with ambiguous
claims, but it has effectively eliminated the best way of avoiding those
traps.
Peripheral claiming has created another, less appreciated, problem on the validity side. It is axiomatic that to be valid, a patent must
“enable”—teach one of skill in the art to make and use—the “full
82
scope” of the claimed invention. But as Jeff Lefstin has pointed out,
it is effectively impossible to enable the full scope of a peripheral
claim, because in a peripheral claiming system even the simplest claim
contains infinite possible embodiments, only some of which can be
83
conceived, much less taught. For a long while, patent courts ignored
this paradox, sometimes by assuming that in a predictable art the
79

See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (“To say that the doctrine of equivalents extends or enlarges the
claims is a contradiction in terms. The claims . . . remain the same and application of
the doctrine expands the right to exclude to ‘equivalents’ of what is claimed.” (italics
omitted)), overruled in part on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83 (1993).
80
Allison & Lemley, supra note 17, at 966-67 (“[P]atentees won only 24% of the
doctrine of equivalents cases decided [from 1999 to 2007].”).
81
See id. at 978 (finding that patentees won 40% of doctrine-of-equivalents cases
prior to Markman)
82
See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping
the New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/
pdf/chao-rethinking-enablement.pdf.
83
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141 (2009).
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PHOSITA could figure out what all the embodiments were, and
sometimes by circularity of reasoning: a patentee only need enable
85
embodiments understood at the time of invention. More recently,
however, the Federal Circuit has been taking seriously the idea that a
peripheral claim must actually enable everything within the periph86
ery. And since, as Lefstin has observed, that is effectively impossible,
the result is a parade of nonobvious inventions whose patents are
nonetheless invalidated on enablement grounds.
In short, the effect of peripheral claiming is not to provide certainty over the meaning of patent claims but to replace debates over
the proper scope of a legal right with debates over the meaning of
terms that often bear only a tenuous relationship to the invention that
87
is the basis of that right. The focus on the meaning of individual
words in patent claims drafted by patent lawyers has displaced a focus
on what the patentee actually invented and how significant that invention is. The result is that, in modern patent litigation, patent scope—
the key policy lever courts can use to ensure that patents encourage
innovation—depends not on what the patentee invented but on what
terms the patent prosecutor chose to use and how clever patent litigators are in twisting the meaning of those terms. That is not a recipe
for socially optimizing patent scope. And the cost of getting the scope
decision wrong is high-–invalidation of a patent deemed overbroad, or
holdup caused by patents that are too broad.
II. CENTRAL CLAIMING
We have described a set of factors, endemic to the peripheral
claiming system, that converge to produce perverse results; the patents construed in Markman hearings are defined in ways that are both
over- and underinclusive. Patent claims can be written or interpreted
to cover things far removed from what the patentee actually built or
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Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
85
In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-06 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
86
See, e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Automotive
Techs. Int’l v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim
Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
87
Cf. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“An
invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent
law. This conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled.”).
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designed, and much abuse of the patent system results from this sort
of opportunistic overclaiming. At the same time, the fact that patents
are defined by their claims gives defendants an opportunity to seize
on a drafting ambiguity in order to escape infringement in cases
where the defendant’s actions should be well within the scope of the
patentee’s invention. And the fact that claim construction has effec88
tively replaced patent law’s doctrine of equivalents means that a single mistake in drafting or interpreting a patent claim can effectively
doom a patent.
The dysfunctional state of patent scope is not happenstance, or at
least it is not mere happenstance. It is rather the product of judicial
and policy decisions that were made as far back as the 1870s, when peripheral claiming, and claims themselves, became ensconced in the
U.S. patent system. To fully understand how we have reached the current situation, we must look back at the development of claims and
claim interpretation, following history from fence posts back to sign
posts. Tracing peripheral claiming to its roots leads very quickly to a
consideration of central claiming—the predecessor from which peripheral claiming developed, and which in many countries continued
as an alternative to peripheral claiming well into the late twentieth
century. In fact, many vestiges of central claiming remain in the
modern U.S. patent system, which has never entirely expurgated its
central claiming origins. In the end, we will find that the development of peripheral claiming presents a familiar story that illuminates
the current difficulties with claim construction and perhaps shows a
way out of those difficulties.
A. From Sign Posts to Fence Posts
Both claims themselves and the interpretation of claims as peripheral markers to the patent rights developed over time as a matter
89
As a textual form, separate claims
of custom and common law.
evolved over a period of decades, largely as a matter of informal con90
vention in response to judicial preferences. The earliest versions of
the U.S. Patent Act required only that an applicant supply what we
would now call a specification to disclose the invention that was the

88

Allison & Lemley, supra note 17, at 978-79.
See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46
MICH. L. REV. 755,757-58 (1948).
90
Id. at 758.
89
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91

subject of the patent. Patents from this period contained no separate statements constituting claims, and courts determined both invalidity and infringement on the basis of the disclosure.
However, in cases involving combinations of old and new elements, some courts viewed the overall description of the invention as
an invalid, overreaching attempt to claim those elements already in
the prior art. These opinions created an incentive for patent drafters
to somehow clarify which aspects of the invention were novel, and so
the proper subject of the patent. Consequently, patent drafters began
to break out of the text a distinct, separate statement of the novel features of the invention as a one sentence “claim,” in order to avoid the
possibility that the patent might be viewed as intended to claim every92
thing in the full description of the invention. Alternatively, some
patents would contain a distinct, separate statement disclaiming the
old, unpatentable features of the invention that might be contained in
93
the full description.
Initially such “claims” were considered useful, and perhaps desirable to clarify the description of the invention, but optional. Patents
were held valid with claims and without claims; claims were simply a
format available when the inventor felt the need to specially denote
particular features of the invention. Neither were the claims read as a
separate statement of the invention; they were read as part of the
overall description, together with the main body of text and drawings
in the patent, to assist in determining what features of the invention
were the subject of the patent. Only over a long period of time did
the addition of claims to the document move from an optional feature, to an expected feature, to a feature required by convention, and
94
ultimately to a feature mandated in formal Patent Office rules.
The use of claims as a mechanism to define the peripheral
boundaries of the patentee’s rights was similarly incremental, evolving
over a period of decades after claims appeared as a distinct textual
component of the patent document. Interpretation of claims as an
outer boundary did not begin as a separate doctrine but appears to

91

U.S. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109.
See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents (pt. 1), 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
134, 139-41 (1938) [hereinafter Lutz, Evolution ].
93
Presumably, had history proceeded a bit differently, instead of claims we might
now have “disclaims” at the end of every patent, see id. at 141, as indeed we now do in
trademark law.
94
See id. at 142-43 (tracing the development of the Act of 1836); see also ELLIS, supra note 20, at 2-4 (analyzing the claim requirement).
92
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have been a continuation of “strict construction” approaches to the
95
patent text that predated the appearance of separate claims. Some
courts treated the patent, with or without claims, as limited to that
which was explicitly described within the four corners of the document. Other courts held that the patent right was not limited to the
specific embodiment disclosed in the patent but encompassed other
96
embodiments or “equivalents” of the disclosed invention. As claims
began to appear as a separate feature of the patent, they became the
focus of this interpretive sparring. As “strict construction” of the
claims gained the upper hand in judicial interpretation, literal interpretation of the claims became regarded as the definitive statement of
what the patent covered, and inventors naturally responded by drafting claims as broadly as possible, to encompass as much technological
space as possible.
The development of peripheral claiming out of judicial strict constructionist approaches was closely related to judicial debates over the
claiming of “principles” in patents. Although courts that strictly construed the text of patents limited the coverage of a patent to that explicitly described in the document, courts holding that the embodiments in the disclosure were representative of the invention typically
extended coverage of the patent to “substantially similar” embodiments. Substantially similar embodiments were sometimes said to be
those encompassing the “same principle” as that disclosed. However,
the same courts rejected overly broad applications of this doctrine,
prohibiting extensions of a patent to either general “principles” of
science or to every possible embodiment of the patented invention’s
“principle.”
The best known examples of this tension appear in the famous
97
98
cases O’Reilly v. Morse and The Telephone Cases. In the former, the
Supreme Court rejected Samuel Morse’s claim to all forms of communication via electromagnetic transmission as an illegitimate at99
tempt to cover all applications of his telegraphic invention; in the latter case, the court approved Bell’s claim to all types of telephonic
100
To some extent these holdings persist in modern docapparatus.
95

See Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 471.
See Lutz, Evolution (pt. 2), supra note 92, at 384 (comparing approaches in Supreme Court cases from the 1853 Term).
97
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
98
126 U.S. 1 (1888).
99
O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 119-20.
100
The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534-35.
96
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trines regarding patentable subject matter or commensurability; modern patents cannot extend to laws or phenomena of nature, nor can
they claim more than they enable, and the cases are often cited for
these propositions. But Bell’s claim recited a limitation to apparatus
substantially similar to that described in his application, making explicit the doctrinal limitation on his centrally claimed invention,
whereas Morse’s claim disclaimed any limitation to his disclosed embodiment, making explicit the doctrinal expansion in his central
claim.
It is clear that the Patent Act followed, rather than drove, these
101
The 1836 Patent
changing practices of courts and patent drafters.
Act made no mention of claims, but it required the patentee to “particularly specify and point out” the novel features that constituted the
invention—such “pointing” being understood as indicating the cen102
tral features of the invention. By 1870, claiming had become part of
the statutory language—familiar to present practitioners, as it has
been retained in the present statute—requiring that the patentee
“particularly point out and distinctly claim” the novel features consti103
tuting the invention. Patent Office guidelines, too, followed rather
than drove claiming practice, reflecting the changes that practitioners
104
made in response to judicial trends.
Claims were initially thought of only as devices for clarifying the
grant of a patent for validity purposes, but after some period of time,
courts began employing claims in determining infringement as well.
The result of this shift, not surprisingly, was for claims drafters to attempt to cover, by explicit claim language, every equivalent that a
court might previously have recognized under the doctrine of equiva105
lents. Peripheral construction of claims gave every incentive for inventors, and the attorneys who represented them, to begin claiming
106
Patent attorneys proout to the very edge of what was patentable.
duced not only more elaborate and convoluted claims attempting to

101

See ROBERT C. KAHRL, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION § 2.04[A], at 2-37 (2001).
ELLIS, supra note 20, at 4-5.
103
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230 § 26, 16 Stat. 198. John Duffy describes the patent
office practice before that time in establishing the boundaries of claims. John F. Duffy,
The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 S. CT. REV.
273, 313 n.131.
104
See Woodward, supra note 89, at 758; see also Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note
92, at 464-66.
105
See ELLIS, supra note 20, at 253.
106
See id. at 123-24.
102
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anticipate possible equivalents of the disclosed embodiment, but
also a greater number of claims per patent. Patentees began to recite
multiple claims directed to different variations of the invention that
108
were to be covered by the patent. This proliferation in the number of
claims dramatically changed the structure of the patent document and
refocused the practice of patent drafting and patent interpretation,
leading some experts to observe that the United States patent system
109
Even though the role of peripheral
had become “claim ridden.”
claiming was well established by the end of the nineteenth century, in
practice that role was tempered by the way in which patent litigation actually occurred. While patent rights were defined by the claims, the
process of claim construction was not itself central to patent litigation.
Rather, the parties litigated validity and infringement as largely factual
questions, and often considered the language of the patent claims
only incidentally, if at all. This was particularly true in the last half of
the twentieth century, when most patent cases began being tried to juries. Juries were told to compare the patent claim to the defendant’s
product, but it seems likely that even if they were not supposed to pay
attention to what the patentee actually invented, they often did so. Indeed, the meaning of the claims themselves was sufficiently sub rosa
that it was not until 1996 that courts even resolved the question of who
110
was responsible for construing those claims. The significant role that
the doctrine of equivalents played during that period also suggests that
111
claims were not the last word in boundary definition.
As a result, it may be fairer to say that during the twentieth century we had not a peripheral-claiming system, but a hybrid peripheralclaiming system. Claims were intended to define the boundaries of
the invention, but we treated the effective definition of those boundaries as a fact-specific question for the judge or the jury and rarely
opened the implicit boundary definition made in the factfinder’s
black box. It was only with the Markman decision in 1996 that we
turned the definition of patent boundaries into a legal decision, made

107

KAHRL, supra note 101, § 2.04[D], at 2-58.
Id. § 2.04[B], at 2-49.
109
Melville Church, Commentary, Comments on Recent Articles, 13 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
459, 459 (1931); see also ELLIS, supra note 20, at 7 (“As a result, patents had fewer
claims before 1870 than they had later.”).
110
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
111
See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (establishing the propriety of the doctrine of equivalents and explaining how and when it
was to be used).
108
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transparently, and thus turned patent scope into an exercise in the interpretation of words.
B. The Continuing Presence of Central Claiming
This brief sketch of the history of claiming in U.S. patent practice
suggests some reasons that central claiming fell into disuse, and it also
suggests how the shift to peripheral claims resulted in a system that
today is not simply “claim ridden” but actually claim burdened. It
suggests that the ascendance of peripheral claiming was not natural or
inevitable, but was highly path dependent. Clearly, central claiming
functioned satisfactorily in U.S. patent law for a considerable period
of time, during an epoch of robust innovation and technical development. Claiming practice might have evolved otherwise; indeed, as
we shall see, it has in fact done so in some situations and jurisdictions.
But if, as we suggest, there is reason to revisit central claiming, we
must ask whether the practice was merely a historical curiosity, a lost
relic of the nineteenth century, or whether there is evidence that central claiming could function in a modern patent system. In fact, we
find that there is considerable evidence to this effect. We draw evidence of central claiming’s viability from its continued presence in
current patent practice, from its employment in many other forms of
IP, and from its use in other industrialized nations’ patent systems
through much of the twentieth century.
Central claiming is by no means foreign to modern patent practice. Although the interpretive practice for claim interpretation has
shifted over time from central to peripheral, elements of central
claiming remain to this day within current patent doctrine—
sometimes in a guise so familiar that the practice is not recognized as
central claiming, and sometimes posing contradictions and anomalies
that puzzle and perplex modern scholars and practitioners. For example, U.S. courts under a peripheral-claiming regime continue to
follow the rule that claims must be read in light of the patent specification; at the same time, a parallel rule forbids them from importing
112
elements from the specification into the claim. In practice, this set
of rules is nearly impossible to follow, since no one can really tell
when they have crossed the line from interpreting the claim in light of
the specification to reading forbidden elements from the specification

112

See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (applying both rules).
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into the claim. The first rule is clearly a legacy of central-claiming
practice, and the latter rule a canon of peripheral-claiming practice;
the fact that they sit uneasily with one another is an artifact of claiming history.
The most prominent legacy from central claiming is likely found
in the present-day doctrine of equivalents. In the heyday of central
claiming, claims were held to cover the disclosed invention and its
equivalents. This language of equivalents continues today in cases
that hold that known substitutes for elements of the claimed invention, or those that produce the same result in the same way, are covered by the claims even if the claims do not literally read upon devices
incorporating such alternatives. But although the language of
“equivalents” is common to both these doctrines, commentators have
been quick to point out that similarity in terminology is not necessar113
Under central claiming,
ily correspondence in concept or effect.
equivalence constituted an expansion of the claims; that is, equivalents considered under central claiming go beyond the language of
the claim, whereas equivalents under peripheral claiming must be
114
those encompassed by the claim. To the outside observer, it seems
plain that under either system, equivalents go beyond the claim, but
the dogma of peripheral claiming demands that the claim remain the
outer bound of the patent, even if courts must go beyond their literal
meaning to reach a sensible result. In short, modern courts engaged
in doctrine of equivalents analysis follow a form of central claiming
while denying that they do so.
We are not the first to note that central claiming is no stranger to
the current Patent Act, in the doctrine of equivalents and elsewhere;
the Supreme Court has similarly observed aspects of central claiming
under current practice. In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemi115
cal Co., addressing the petitioner’s arguments that peripheral claiming was inconsistent with the doctrine of equivalents, and that the
doctrine was concomitantly inconsistent with the statutory requirement to “distinctly claim” the invention, the Court noted that the doc-

113

See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 20, § 10.
Thus, Judge Rich, one of the drafters of the current Patent Act, goes to some
pains to insist that the doctrine of equivalents gives the patentee only what she would
have been entitled to had the language of her claims been properly precise. See Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(Rich, J.), overruled in part on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83 (1993).
115
520 U.S. 17 (1997).
114
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trine of equivalents has grown up since the advent of peripheral
claiming and reiterated its holding that the doctrine is compatible
116
The
with current obligations to describe and claim the invention.
Court also noted persistent characteristics of central claiming in other
areas of current practice, offering for example that “judicial recognition of so-called ‘pioneer’ patents suggests that the abandonment of
117
‘central’ claiming may be overstated.”
The reverse doctrine of equivalents, too, has its origins in the
118
Reverse equivalents constitutes an oppractice of central claiming.
tional component of literal claim analysis, relieving the accused infringer of liability if the accused device, despite falling within the literal scope of the claims, is so far changed in principle that it performs
a different function in a different way than the equivalent structure in
the patent. The classic statement of reverse equivalents comes from
119
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., a case decided near the end of
the central claiming era. Westinghouse involved an allegedly infringing
locomotive air brake that comprised structures, including a particular
120
valve, that read on the language of the patent in suit. But in considering the accused device, the court determined that the valve performed a different function than the analogous structure in the pat121
This finding placed the accused device within the
ented air brake.
periphery of the claim language, but outside the invention of the patent—the allegedly infringing device was so far changed in principle
that it no longer incorporated the gist or character of the patented invention. Hence, no infringement was found even though the claims
literally read on the device.
The reverse doctrine of equivalents has not been applied much in
recent years, and Federal Circuit judges have sometimes even suggested that the doctrine is dead. But the reports of its death have
been exaggerated. The court does still apply the doctrine on occa122
sion.
116

Id. at 26 n.3 & 27 n.4.
Id. at 27 n.4.
118
See Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 473-74.
119
170 U.S. 537 (1898).
120
Id. at 537-38.
121
Id. at 583.
122
The doctrine is rarely applied, and the Federal Circuit in Tate Access Floors, Inc.
v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002), suggested
that the doctrine had no continued meaning after the passage of the 1952 Patent Act.
The court also (misleadingly) suggested that it had never applied the doctrine. Cf.
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
117
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The legacy of central claiming also lives on in the practice of
means-plus-function claiming. Section 112 of the Patent Act expressly
permits claiming elements of the invention in terms of a “means” for
performing some function; the scope of the claim extends not to all
possible means of performing that function, but only to those dis123
closed in the specification, plus equivalents thereof. This referential
structure is precisely the same as that found under the former regime
of central claiming; patentees would routinely claim their invention
124
“substantially as described,” that is, as disclosed in the specification.
And that disclosed embodiment would constitute the exemplar, supplemented by protection afforded to equivalent devices.
Central claiming also continues to function outside of patents as a
mainstay of IP analysis. Modern patent practice ostensibly embraces
peripheral claiming. But in IP generally, the peripheral claiming
scheme of patent law is the odd man out. Other forms of IP tend toward a central claiming approach rather than attempting to linguistically delimit the exclusive rights associated with their subject matter.
The patent system’s parallel constitutional IP system—copyright—
involves no peripheral claims. When determining the extent of the
exclusive rights in copyright, courts do not rely on a description of the
work, but rather look to the fixed format of the work itself as the starting point for determining the scope of protection. In the paradigm
copyright case, where the protected work is a book, play, poem or
other text, it is that text that constitutes the “core” or “gist” of the
work; indeed, it would seem more than a little odd to copyright lawyers to suggest that copyright holders should draft some “metatext”
125
describing the metes and bounds of the copyrighted text. Copyright
cases then ask whether the allegedly infringing text is “substantially
126
similar” to the copyrighted work —akin to comparing the patentee’s
disclosed invention to the defendant’s product.

1991) (applying the reverse doctrine of equivalents). The Federal Circuit has since
backed off from this crabbed and ahistorical reading. See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting the dictum from
Tate Access).
123
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
124
See ELLIS, supra note 20, § 24; Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 470.
125
But many judicial opinions concerning copyright infringement might be described as such “metatexts,” as they typically spend a considerable number of words
describing the scope and protected features of the copyrighted text.
126
See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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Similarly, trademark law entails a type of analysis involving the
“heart” or “gist” of the exclusive right and leaves determination of its
boundaries to courts on a case-by-case basis. Trademark law begins
not with a description of the metes and bounds of the trademark
right, setting out the fullest extent of protection, but rather with the
mark itself—the logo, symbol, sound, or smell that a consumer would
associate with the source of goods or services. Under a likelihood-ofconfusion standard, the analysis then asks whether an allegedly infringing mark would be considered sufficiently similar to be confusing
127
to an ordinary observer.
A similar pattern holds true in the law of trade secrets. Trade secrets are notoriously difficult to define in judicial pleadings and discovery orders. For strategic reasons, it is in a defendant’s interests to
attempt definition as early in a suit as possible, but in a plaintiff’s in128
terests to delay definition until as late in a suit as possible. Many jurisdictions require a plaintiff to “identify the trade secret with reason129
able particularity” before discovery in an enforcement action can
proceed. As in central claiming, the burden is on the owner of the
trade secret to describe what she considers her confidential business
information, rather than to describe the boundary that defines mis130
appropriation.
One might reasonably object that copyright and trade secret law
are different because both require proof of copying and therefore
131
In that context,
proof of access to, and use of, the plaintiff’s work.
the legal definition of the boundaries of the invention might be less
important, for we know that the defendant started from the plaintiff’s
work. As such, the only issue is the strength of the legal right, not the
factual definition of what is included.
127

See 15 U.S.C. § 1114; see also, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999) (discussing the standard set
forth in the Lanham Act).
128
See Kevin R. Casey, Identification of Trade Secrets During Discovery: Timing and
Specificity, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 254 (1996).
129
E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (West 2007); see also AutoMed Techs.,
Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (applying the requirement that a
plaintiff first identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity); Porous Media
Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 598, 599-600 (D. Minn. 1999) (same); Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505 A.2d 30, 33 (Del. Ch. 1986) (same).
130
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210.
131
See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding, due in part to the
fact that plaintiff’s song was not commercially successful, that there was no access and
therefore no copying to support an infringement claim); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §
1, 14 U.L.A. 538 (2006) (amended 1985).
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Even if that argument justifies distinguishing copyright and trade
secret from peripheral claiming systems, it does not explain trade132
mark law, which has no requirement of copying. Neither does it explain the role of central claiming within the patent system, where utility patents are unique in their reliance on peripheral claiming.
Design patents set forth an image of their subject and claim the design as presented; the Federal Circuit recently rejected the idea that
the image itself should be subject to a Markman-style claim133
construction process. Similarly, because of the difficulty of presenting a written description of a distinctive plant, plant patents typically
use an image of the foliage or flower covered by the patent; this exemplar of the actual invention is the starting place for determination
134
of validity or infringement, another example of central claiming.
Central claiming also operated as the norm in major industrialized nations well into the late twentieth century. For example, Korea
employed central claiming until a statutory change in 1980 instituted
peripheral claiming; even then, courts continued to apply central135
claiming methods well into the 1990s. Central claiming was also the
approach in Germany until accession to the European Patent Convention required harmonization with the peripheral approaches of other
EPC member states; at that point, Germany moved to an intermediate
position that continues to incorporate many aspects of central claim136
For the last several decades it has sought to integrate the two,
ing.
using peripheral claiming as a starting point but making liberal use of
137
the doctrine of equivalents and purposive claim interpretation.
Nonetheless, the German Federal Supreme Court has reaffirmed the
138
central-claiming-based “substantial difference” test. Thus, Germany
has to some extent oscillated between the two approaches to claim
132

But cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1626-31 (2006) (finding that intent, one of many factors relevant to a finding of likelihood of confusion, is in fact the most important one).
133
See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
134
35 U.S.C. § 162 (2006).
135
See C. Leon Kim, Transition from Central to Peripheral Definition Patent Claim Interpretation System in Korea, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 411 (1995).
136
See WILFRIED STOCKMAIR, THE PROTECTION OF TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS AND
DESIGNS IN GERMANY 93 (1994); TAKENAKA, supra note 14, at 36-38.
137
See TAKENAKA, supra note 14, at 36-38; Allan M. Soobert, Analyzing Infringement
by Equivalents: A Proposal to Focus the Scope of International Patent Protection, 22 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 189, 207-11 (1996).
138
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 29, 1986, 98
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 12 (14) (F.R.G.),
translated and excerpted in 18 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 795, 798 (1987).
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construction: German claiming practice began with peripheral claiming in the nineteenth century, then, in counterpoint to the movement
of claiming practice in the United States, moved away from peripheral
139
claiming toward central claiming.
Even countries like the United Kingdom, which nominally practice peripheral claiming, rarely do so with the literalism that U.S. practice has adopted. In Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.,
for example, the British House of Lords rejected the literalism of U.S.
peripheral claiming in favor of a more functional definition of the
140
claim driven by what the patentee actually invented.
Finally, it may be that central claiming persisted even in U.S. patent law until the late twentieth century. While we have had claims for
over a century, the fact that claim construction was not a separate
process until 1995 arguably permitted juries and even judges to effectively focus on what the patentee actually invented, even if the claims
pointed in a different direction. Thus, John Golden argues that while
we adopted claims in the 1870s, “the true triumph of modern peripheral claiming occurred about one hundred years later, in the last dec141
ades of the twentieth century.”
C. Rules and Standards in Claim Construction
In previous Sections we have reviewed a variety of instances where
central claiming operates successfully. This survey also says something
about the provenance of central-claiming practices. Though billed as
a “peripheral claiming” system, the U.S. system is, at best, a hybrid,
where elements of a central-claiming legacy intermingle with the current apparatus of peripheral claiming. Although this is not as explicitly clear in the U.S. system as it is in the German system—in part because the German shift toward peripheral claiming is more recent—
familiarity with U.S. patent doctrine reveals a system often at odds

139

For a detailed discussion of claim construction in Germany, see TAKENAKA, supra note 14, at 26-38.
140
[2004] UKHL 46 (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ.)) (U.K.).
141
John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 349, 35255 (2008); see also Paul M. Janicke, Heat of Passion: What Really Happened in Graver
Tank, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (1996) (describing the hybrid system that existed before the
1950 decision in Graver Tank).
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with itself, attempting to reconcile the elements of central and pe142
ripheral claiming.
The differences between central claiming and peripheral claiming
bear all the hallmarks of the classic debate over the relative virtues of
143
There is a large literature exploring the charrules and standards.
acteristics of these two types of legal formulations: on the one hand,
bright-line, defined legal “rules” that attempt to precisely delineate legally acceptable behavior; and on the other hand, flexible, more
nebulous “standards” that offer guidance rather than precision in articulating expected behavior but allow tailoring to the facts of specific
cases. Rules are sometimes described as “crystalline,” having clear and
explicit definitions; standards are sometimes described as “muddy,”
144
having more fuzzy or inchoate parameters.
Both types of imperatives are found in the law, and both have
145
their virtues and vices.
The two form something of an inverse,
matched pair; the virtues of rules complement the vices of standards,
and vice versa. The upside of rules is that they give clear guidance as
to expected behavior; the downside is that they do not accommodate

142

For example, Jeff Lefstin traces current doctrinal tensions between the writtendescription requirement and claim definiteness to unresolved incongruities arising in
the shift from central to peripheral claiming. Lefstin, supra note 83 (manuscript at 8889). Lefstin has identified a fundamental disjunction in modern patent doctrine that
may only be resolvable by a return to central claiming.
143
Jeanne Fromer has made a similar point. See Fromer, supra note 15 (manuscript at 28-31).
144
The body of literature on this topic is extensive. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997); Pierre Schlag,
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules,
83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
For a debate on the merits of rules and standards in patent law, see ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 805-06 (3d ed. 2002); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U.
L. REV. 771, 792-96 (2003); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration
and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 234-37 (2002). See also Thomas Chen,
Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165,
1175 (2008) (noting the need to trade off the “simultaneous challenges of inefficiency,
indeterminacy, and information costs”).
145
See, e.g., MindGames, Inc. v. Western Pub. Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir.
2000) (Posner, J.) (“No sensible person supposes that rules are always superior to standards, or vice versa.”).
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specific and unforeseen factual circumstances. Standards display the
inverse set of benefits and detriments: they are flexible enough to accommodate specific and unforeseen factual circumstances, but they
give poor advance guidance as to expected behavior.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of these distinctive
classes of imperatives is that rules and standards contemplate decisions made at different times. Under rules, the expected behavior is
determined ex ante, whereas standards leave that determination to be
made ex post. Thus, the ability or inability to foresee relevant factual
scenarios and responses favors either rules or standards. Standards
are preferable where the circumstances likely to arise are difficult to
determine ahead of time and proper behavior is best defined after an
actual situation has occurred. By contrast, rules are preferable where
it is feasible to anticipate the likely facts ahead of time and predetermine the applicable behavior.
A rules/standards distinction grounded in foreseeability and temporality carries with it implications for institutional competence. Institutions that are equipped for ex ante investigation and determination are best suited to develop rule-based imperatives. Institutions
that are better equipped for ex post factfinding and response should
generally be entrusted with standards-based imperatives. As a practical matter, in the American legal system this means that legislatures
tend to set rules and courts tend to apply standards, with administrative agencies functioning in both capacities, sometimes setting regulations and sometimes adjudicating cases.
In drawing distinctions between rules and standards, it is critical
to realize that these classifications are not pristine—pure rules and
pure standards are a rarity, and the classification itself identifies the
polar ends of a continuum, with a range of hybrids arrayed between
the poles. Nor are these designations static; the character of both
rules and standards is generally in flux. As Carol Rose has noted, rules
tend to progress toward standards over time, as the rigidity of a rule
146
The explicit imperatives of the
leads to absurd or unjust results.
rule will be infused by adjudicators or administrators with standardlike flexibility. This softening of the rules’ hard edges occurs over
time until the rule effectively becomes a standard. The inverse process occurs with standards: to save time and effort, adjudicators who
are administering standards will begin to carve out bright-line, explicit, or per se rules for situations that seem clear and foreseeable. As
146

See Rose, supra note 12, at 580-90.
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these carve-outs accrete over time, the standard may eventually
harden into a set of rules. Having reached the opposite end of the
continuum from where they began, the transformed rules or standards may then begin the reverse evolution, precessing back toward
the pole where they began.
The history we have described, leading to the formulation of peripheral rules in the United States, closely follows the paradigm that
Carol Rose and others set out for the precession between rules and
standards. Searching for greater certainty, courts and patent attorneys
substituted the ostensibly bright lines of peripheral claiming for the
flexible standards of central claiming. But the search for such certainty is particularly problematic in the case of patent claims. The
idea that patent language could offer public notice comparable to the
“metes and bounds” of real property is an appealing, and as we have
seen, pervasive trope. As Jeff Lefstin points out, the metes and
bounds of a property line define a single physical entity, but the peripherally construed claims of a patent are directed to multiple theo147
Thus metes and bounds are simultaneously both a
retical entities.
central and a peripheral claim. In the case of real property, the legal
and physical boundaries of real property coincide; so too with the legal description of a chattel, such as an automobile identified by make,
model, year, and vehicle identification number (VIN). These descriptions of physical property define a physical limit to which legal rights
attach, an actual border within which the owner enjoys the prerogatives of ownership.
That doesn’t mean there are never disputes over real property
rights—there surely are—but they are almost always disputes over the
legal consequences of real property, not over whether a particular
piece of land is within the scope of the property at all. This is generally not the case for peripheral patent claims. Certainly some patent
claims may be so narrow as to encompass only a single embodiment of
the invention, in which case the physical and legal borders of the
148
But typically, patent claims that are peripherclaims will coincide.

147

Lefstin, supra note 83 (manuscript at 63).
The question of boundary coincidence bears on Fromer’s argument that dependent patent claims are central embodiments of broader independent claims. See
Fromer, supra note 15 (manuscript at 16). Certainly because dependent claims are
usually narrowed claims, perhaps even reading on a single embodiment of the invention, their legal boundaries may tend to coincide more nearly with the physical
boundary of a given embodiment of the invention. But under current practice they
are still clearly peripherally construed.
148
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ally construed will define a legal border far beyond the physical parameters of the inventor’s actual embodiment: not one automobile,
but many, some of which do not exist, never did exist, and quite possibly never will exist. Peripheral claim language seeks to encompass
those nonexistent embodiments and so cannot offer even the degree
149
of deterministic certainty that a physical description would give.
Consequently, the quest for definitional certainty falters. As the
theory predicts, bright lines are often not all they promise to be; they
don’t fit many situations in practice and have to be altered, fudged,
and even discarded when the fit is poor. Eventually, the alterations,
fudging, and discarding become so pronounced that the rules effectively become standards, and they eventually become recognized as
such. Germany has seen such a claim-construction cycle, from peripheral claiming to central and back again. It may be that the
anomalies in the U.S. system have reached the point that it is time for
the wheel to turn again here as well.
We think that the theory also tells us something additional about
the failure of peripheral claiming that we described in Part I. Brightline rules work best where an institution is able to determine the optimal legal imperative ex ante. Standards work best where an institution is able to determine the optimal legal imperative ex post. The
patent system entails one of each type of institution: an administrative
agency, of the sort that is probably best suited to ex ante rulemaking,
and a court system, that is probably best suited to ex post adjudication.
Claims are formed in the first institution but interpreted in the second. And the selection of a bright-line peripheral-claiming approach
for judicial claim-construction confounds this allocation of authority.
It is virtually impossible for any institution to make sensible predictions about a particular patentable innovation: about the applications that will emerge for the patentee’s invention, the variations of
the invention that might develop, the competing or substitute technologies that will arise, or the dependence or independence of complementary technologies to the given invention. Institutionally, the
Patent Office, with a corps of technical experts, is well positioned to
tell us whether the invention is novel, innovative and significant, or,
more often, to tell us whether it was so at the time of invention or application filing date. But the PTO is composed of technical experts,
not legal experts or economists, and certainly not crystal-ball gazers.
The PTO cannot tell what the proper scope of the patent will be going
149

See Lefstin, supra note 83.
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into the future, particularly given the paucity of resources available for
examination and the limited time spent with any given application. It
is not at all clear that it would make any difference if additional resources were made available. As one of us has argued elsewhere,
given the negligible social value of most patents, it is inconceivable
that we would want to invest the resources necessary to fully vet every
150
patent application for validity, much less the resources that would
be required to accurately predict all the ways that the market might
use or modify an invention. And using the PTO to determine patent
scope is particularly problematic given that patent examiners have no
experience evaluating infringement as opposed to patent validity.
Rather, the innovations that are worth fighting for sort themselves out
over time and are vetted by the institution best able to make an ex
post determination regarding patent value and scope: the courts.
Determinations of patent infringement and validity are placed in
the hands of courts, which are largely retrospective institutions, incrementally calibrating the proper legal imperative case by case, ex
post. We have argued elsewhere that this is not a mistake—that courts
151
are best equipped as custodians of patent doctrine. But peripheral
claiming stands this custody on its head, purporting to set forth the
maximal boundary of the patent grant during the application process,
before the measure of the inventor’s contribution or the different
variants that competitors might adopt can be properly assessed. Of
course, some infringement cases will prove to be blatant, free-riding
misappropriation of the inventor’s contributions, but many other al152
leged infringements will prove to be more nuanced. Some will even
be blatant, expansionist market-grabbing by the inventor.
It is not surprising, therefore, that looking at patent claims ex
post, courts are often forced to devise some “breathing room” at the
edges of the claims to secure sensible results. With the doctrine of
equivalents no longer of much significance, increasingly courts do so
150

See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 1495, 1497 (2001) (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few
cases than to invest in additional resources examining patents that will never be heard
from again.”).
151
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 18, at 95 (noting that courts are the right place
for conducting a “sensitive policy analysis” for the patent system).
152
Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270160 (finding
that only a tiny percentage of patent cases involve copying as opposed to independent
invention by defendants).
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by distorting the boundaries of the claims while professing to honor
them. In Part I, we showed numerous examples in which the words of
153
claims were stretched to their limit, and beyond. This type of interpretive legerdemain seems to be evidence that courts have been engaged in a sort of central claiming all along. Far from representing
the outer perimeter of the patentee’s exclusive rights, claim language
has come to constitute merely a jumping-off point for judicial exploration of the patent’s actual outer boundaries. If courts, as a practical
matter, aren’t paying peripheral claim construction more than lip service, then perhaps it is time to explicitly reinstate central claiming as
154
the preferred approach.
III. IMPLEMENTING CENTRAL CLAIMING
What we have said so far suggests that much of the trouble in current treatment of claims arises from the unrealistic expectations built
into the system of peripheral claiming. While peripheral claiming
forces the courts into the protracted and expensive interpretive charade that typifies modern claim construction, central claiming would
allow the courts to modulate the scope of patents, as they are best
suited to do. But dethroning the centrality of the “fence post” patent
claim would require some significant changes to the way the current
patent system operates. Peripheral claiming did not emerge in the
United States or elsewhere overnight, and it will not disappear overnight either. As we have noted in the recent example of the German
patent system, hybrids may emerge in the transition of one approach
155
to the other. Consequently, we consider two things here: the likely
effects of a complete shift to central claiming, and certain intermediate measures that might serve as a prelude to full-fledged central
claiming, which by themselves might ameliorate many of the problems
that we have identified here.
A. How Central Claiming Might Work in the United States
To consider the ramifications of a shift to central claiming, we
must look systematically at the likely effects on the institutions that
153

See supra notes 5-9.
Terry Fisher put it this way to us: peripheral claiming is a local maximum. We
have spent enormous effort getting to the top of the hill, but we could get much
higher if we abandoned this hill, moved across the plain, and climbed a different
mountain.
155
See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
154
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mediate the patent system: the Patent Office, the courts, and to some
extent the patent bar. We consider first how the patent document
might change under central claiming, where such changes might be
initiated, and whether a system of central claiming will serve the purposes of patent law.
1. Do We Need Patent Claims at All?
As a practical matter, the shift from peripheral to central claiming
could occur in one of two ways. The first would be to jettison claims
altogether as a separate feature of the patent document. This would
essentially return to the pre-1870 practice of preparing a patent
document where the written description of the invention serves to define the basis for the patent right. Claims would of course be available
as a drafting strategy if the patentee felt that they would assist her in
describing the novel features and principle of the invention. But
since they would not define the scope of the invention, there would
be less incentive to use them at all, and certainly far less incentive to
obsess over them in the way that current claim practice does.
Some might view this approach as the most radical embrace of
central claiming, in part because it would be the most apparent: it
would alter the format of the patent document. It might also be considered the most radical for a different reason: the Patent Act re156
As we have
quires the patentee to “distinctly claim” the invention.
discussed above, this phrase has, since its introduction into the statute
in 1870, been understood to refer to, and to require, a separate sec157
Since separate claims
tion of the patent document called “claims.”
had become the practice at the time of the 1870 statute, the statute
158
Absent a
was understood to recognize and formalize that practice.
statutory amendment to remove the reference to “claims,” failure to
include discrete claims might be viewed as failing to meet the requirements of the statute.
It is not clear to us that the statute need necessarily be read this
way. As discussed above, claims arose in order to identify the novel
159
features of inventions in patent applications.
If the statutory language is read as intended to accomplish that goal—to have patentees
156

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
158
Lutz, Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 470.
159
Cf. ELLIS, supra note 20, at 3; Lutz, Evolution (pt. 1), supra note 92, at 142; Lutz,
Evolution (pt. 3), supra note 92, at 467.
157
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designate or claim the novel features of their invention—then this
function need not necessarily be addressed by a separate section of
the document. It can be done in the specification and drawings—the
patentee could even use the term “I claim” in some part of the specification, not separately broken out as discrete claims (a practice that
was in fact seen in some nineteenth-century patents). The legislative
intent could plausibly be seen as requiring some type of “claim,” but
not the separate claims that were the practice when the “claim” language was added to the statute. This view of the statute might not sit
well with some as a matter of legislative intent, but it would not be the
first time that a court would have recognized the purpose dictated by
a statute as superior to a particular form that seems to be dictated by
that statute.
We suspect that many in the patent community would find the
second option more palatable: leave claims in place as a separate feature of the patent document but stop reading them as peripheral
“boundaries” and start reading them as part of the overall description
of the invention as actually conceived and executed by the inventor.
This option would essentially return to the late-nineteenth-century
practice, around the time of the 1870 statute, of employing and even
requiring claims, but treating them as central rather than periph160
This could avoid any need for a statutory revision; the Patent
eral.
Act refers to claims but says nothing about how they are to be regarded or interpreted. Of course, there might be some virtue in a legislative imperative to get the courts and the PTO headed in the same
direction at the same time. But peripheral claiming—and claims
themselves—evolved through judicial practice with legislative recognition following later; we see no reason that a return to central claiming
could not happen similarly.
Eliminating the requirement that claims appear as a separate feature of the patent document would have significant advantages. Central claiming will work best if the court’s attention is focused on the
patentee’s invention rather than on the patent lawyer’s words attempting to define that invention. In addition, the practice of peripheral
claiming may be so ingrained in the patent bar after more than a century of experience that lawyers would be tempted to write claims in
peripheral terms, making it harder for judges to apply central claiming to those claims.

160

See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
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While this approach would not require claims, it should not forbid
them either, as they might be useful in some cases to describe the invention. We suspect that inventive activity in certain fields might lend
itself to the current claim format, even if current experience demonstrates that inventive activity in many fields does not. Additionally, we
view the voluntary availability of claims as beneficial in part because
voluntary claims might best facilitate the adoption of hybrid or intermediate forms of claiming that we discuss below. In any event, in the
sections that follow we explore how a world without claims, or with
explicitly central claims, might work.
2. Central Claims in the PTO
We turn next to the impact of central claiming, beginning at the
PTO, where things would change substantially, and almost certainly
for the better. The PTO today is overwhelmed. Patent pendency is
much longer than it has ever been, and the problem is getting worse,
not better. The PTO is not even keeping pace with new applications,
161
much less eating into the enormous backlog. Much of the time and
cost of the prosecution process—and much of the backlog occasioned
by continuation applications—result from drafting, evaluating, and
arguing over patent claims. Patent lawyers spend far more time and
money drafting patent claims than they do tinkering with the actual
disclosure of the patent. While the PTO does not expressly engage in
162
a process of claim construction, it does need to implicitly determine
what patent claims mean in order to decide whether they are antici163
pated by or obvious in view of the prior art. And even when the examiner and the applicant are not arguing over what the patent claims
161

See, e.g., Ron D. Katznelson, President, Bi-Level Techs., Presentation at Fenwick
& West Lecture Series Inaugural Symposium, UC Davis School of Law: The Perfect
Storm of Patent Reform? (Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/
rkatznelson/54.
162
For suggestions that the PTO should be more involved in claim construction,
see, for example, Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177 (2005); see also Chen, supra note 144. But see
William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327 (2009) (arguing that ex ante scope determinations will not work and that we must wait to define
patent scope in the context of particular disputes). We are inclined to Hubbard’s view
on this point.
163
See, e.g., In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying the rule that
the PTO gives patents their “broadest reasonable interpretation” rather than choosing
a specific construction). For a discussion of that rule and its problems, see Michael
Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179 (2007).
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cover, they still spend most of the patent-application process comparing the prior art to the patent claims, arguing about the differences,
and most importantly, amending the claims to try to make them pat164
entable. Claim-construction worries, disputes, and amendments are
also primarily responsible for the significant growth in the use of patent continuations and requests for continued examination (RCEs),
which in turn are responsible for a significant part of the delay in pat165
ent prosecution.
Patent prosecution without peripheral claims would look very different. Applicants would still submit, and examiners would still search
for, prior art. But they would not have to spend time drafting, arguing about, or amending patent claims. Nor would there be any reason
for applicants to file continuations or RCEs, since the patented invention would be the same under central claiming regardless. The combination will lead to lower-cost applications and more efficient (and
166
therefore hopefully quicker) examinations. Examiners who need to
spend less time with any given application can process more applications, which will reduce the backlog. Alternatively, they can devote
more time to reading and evaluating prior art for any given application, reducing the risk of error. In addition, the elimination of any
need for continuation applications will both reduce the backlog problem by ending delay and reduce the number of applications that the
office must process.
3. Central Claiming in Litigation
Central claiming would also have significant advantages once a
patent issued. The primary advantage of central claiming is that it
puts the focus on what the patentee actually invented rather than on
what patent lawyers later (often much later) drafted as claims to cover
the ground in that invention. By eliminating collateral disputes over
164

See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 150, at 1499-1500.
On the growth of patent continuations over time, see, for example, Stuart J.H.
Graham & David C. Mowery, Submarines in Software? Continuations in U.S. Software Patenting in the 1980s and 1990s, 13 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 443 (2004); Lemley
& Sampat, supra note 71. On the role of continuations in causing delay in patent
prosecution, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of
Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004). One form of continuation—the continuation-in-part (CIP) application—would presumably continue in a central-claiming
regime.
166
Cf. Samson Vermont, Taming the Doctrine of Equivalents in Light of Patent Failure,
16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 83, 91 (2008) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents reduces
the cost of drafting claims by avoiding the need to anticipate every eventuality).
165
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the meaning of claim language not written by the inventor, and oftentimes not written anytime near the invention date, central claiming
can protect both patentees and accused infringers. Patentees are protected from claim-drafting errors that impose unnecessary limits on
the scope of their claims, in many cases rendering them effectively
168
Accused infringers are protected from strategic claim
worthless.
drafting that expands the patent to cover things well beyond the con169
templation of the inventor.
And courts are given the power to determine the scope of a patent based on the inventive contribution that

167

See, e.g., Dana Wang, A Process Model of Creating and Out-Licensing Intellectual Property (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (employing a case
study to investigate the various contributors to the creation of a patent beyond the inventor).
168
A striking example is Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2004), where the Federal Circuit held that a patent claim that mistakenly called
for heating dough “to” 400 degrees rather than “at” 400 degrees was infringed only if
defendants actually incinerated their bread. While Chef America is extreme in its reliance on form over substance in claim construction, there are any number of cases in
which words collateral to the main dispute are given meaning that renders the claim
ineffective. See, e.g., Larami Corp. v. Amron, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1280, 1283 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) (interpreting “chamber therein for a liquid” in a toy water gun patent in
such a way that an external liquid reservoir does not literally infringe the claim, when
in fact the main dispute was over the use of air pressure). Claim constructions also often render the invention less valuable than intended by excluding from scope things
the patentee clearly intended to include. See, e.g., Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939
F.2d 1558, 1562-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (construing the term “right angle corner pieces,”
in a patent for a method of affixing fabric to a wall, as encompassing only preformed
corner pieces and not mitered linear pieces); Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom
Equip. Inc., No. 08-1027 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2008) (relying on language “partially hidden from view” to exclude plaintiff’s own embodiment from the scope of its patent);
Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (refusing
to correct a patent claim for a fireplace that included the phrase “rear walls” rather
than “rear wall”).
This can’t be good public policy. As Chief Justice Marshall put it in one of the earliest Supreme Court patent cases, “If, by an innocent mistake, the [patent] fails in its
object, the public ought not to avail itself of this mistake, and to appropriate the discovery without paying.” Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 244 (1832).
169
Examples here are legion. Acacia claims to have invented video on demand, In
re Acacia Media Techs. Corp., No. 05-1114, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37009 (N.D. Ca. Jul.
19, 2005), Caritas to have invented VoIP, Caritas Techs., Inc. v. Comcast Corp., No. 050339, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98006 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2006), Rembrandt to have invented digital television, Harris Corp. v. Rembrandt Techs., No. 07-0796, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69680 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 20, 2007), Freeny to have invented multimedia,
Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and
BT to have invented global e-commerce, British Telecomm. PLC v. Prodigy Communs.
Corp., 189 F. Supp. 2d 101 (2002), all based not on what they actually designed or described in the patent but on the fact that the language of their patent claims can be
read in hindsight to cover those later-developed technologies.
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the patentee actually made, rather than on the vagaries of claim drafting and the skill of lawyers on both sides at exploiting claim ambiguity.
B. Considering Objections to Central Claiming
These advantages do not come without cost, however. At the
PTO, the cost is primarily in the assessment of novelty and nonobviousness. An invention is anticipated (i.e., not novel) if each and every
170
element of the invention is present in a single piece of prior art. An
invention is obvious if one of ordinary skill in the art would be moti171
vated and able to produce the invention without undue effort. Under peripheral claiming, the PTO compares the prior art to the full
range of the claims to the prior art, finding a genus claim anticipated
if the prior art overlaps with it even in a small part. Put another way, if
a patent claims a group of a thousand different chemicals, evidence
that even one of those chemicals was already known will invalidate the
patent claim. So too with obviousness.
But the absence of a well-defined boundary creates a problem for
this analysis. Suppose the patentee has discovered a new class of
chemicals, but in a central claiming system merely discloses the
chemicals she has actually used. How is the PTO to know whether the
invention is anticipated or rendered obvious by a different chemical
172
We can imagine two different approaches. First,
in the prior art?
170

35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399-400.
172
Central claiming may also have implications for PTO interference practice.
Interferences are proceedings conducted by the Patent Office to determine priority of
invention when there is more than one claimant to a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 146. Interferences are conducted with reference to a “count”—a manufactured claim constructed for purposes of the interference—against which evidence of priority is assessed. In some cases, the junior party will provoke an interference by copying the
claims of the published senior-party patent to ensure complete overlap of the claims.
In such cases, the count will be the copied claims because of the complete overlap.
But where the claims are not identical, the PTO must construct the count from the
coincident portions of the contested claims. This is quintessentially an exercise in peripheral-boundary drawing, as the count represents the overlapping coverage of the
competing patent claims, like the overlapping spaces represented by intersecting circles in a Venn diagram.
It is possible that interference practice could eventually be eliminated by a change
in American patent law to “first to file” patent granting, but that reform to American
law has proved elusive and seems unlikely at any time in the near future. In the interim, a shift back to central claiming might eliminate the relevance of a peripherally
constructed count. In the cases where a junior party had copied claims, both parties
would necessarily have claimed the “heart” or central principles of the invention. But
outside of copied claims, the question to be resolved would be whether the later inven171
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the PTO might endeavor to determine how broadly a court might
eventually construe the claim to be, and to decide whether a claim of
that breadth would be novel and nonobvious. Alternatively, the PTO
might substantially narrow its validity analysis, rejecting an application
only when the heart of the invention itself tread upon or was obvious
in view of the prior art.
Pre-Markman PTO practice carried elements of the first approach;
while the PTO did not and does not expressly construe patent claims,
a longstanding rule required it to give a patent claim the “broadest
reasonable construction” in deciding whether the claim ran afoul of
173
In effect, this was a form of construing the patent
the prior art.
claim against the drafter and therefore of resolving doubts against
patentability. Curiously, however, no similar rule gives patents a
broad construction during litigation. Indeed, in cases of ambiguity in
litigation, courts construe patent claims narrowly rather than
174
broadly.
We are inclined instead toward the second alternative. In a world
without a multiplicity of peripheral claims, the right question of patent validity should in fact be whether the patentee has made something new. The fact that the patentee might argue for an overbroad
scope for that new invention seems to us a reason to narrow the scope
of the patentee’s right in litigation, not to deprive her of the right to
the invention altogether.
This narrowing still leaves a role for the PTO in policing patent
scope under a central-claiming system. The PTO would serve a useful
function by identifying the closest relevant prior art even if that art
did not invalidate the heart of the patent. That prior art could be
used by subsequent courts to cabin the proper scope of the patent.
Under this approach, central claiming would greatly simplify the
job of the PTO, but it would do so by giving the office much less opportunity to invalidate patents altogether. That leads us to the second
tor had first conceived the central characteristics or features of the claimed invention,
rather than whether the elements of the count were found in an earlier conception.
Shared central features, rather than intersecting peripheral boundaries, would determine whether the same invention had been conceived earlier by one inventor than by
another.
173
See, e.g., In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
174
See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (holding that, when two constructions are equally likely, courts are to pick the
narrower one); cf. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194-95 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (holding that the broadest-reasonable-construction rule did not apply to meansplus-function claims).
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problem, however. If patents survive PTO scrutiny because the core
of the patent is different from what is in the prior art, one foreseeable
effect is more patent litigation, with more uncertainty as to the outcome of those suits, since courts will bear a larger burden in defining
the scope of the patent right for purposes of both validity and infringement. While we have suggested that this result offers some advantages—it requires courts to focus on validity and infringement together and to engage in a real analysis of the scope of the patent
claims on the basis of what the patentee actually invented rather than
what the lawyer wrote—there is no doubt that the prospect of not
knowing what a patent covers until late in the litigation process will be
a frightening one to many.
Those skeptical about central claiming, then, might worry that it
175
will fail to perform the “public notice” functions of patent claims.
The ostensible purpose of peripheral claiming includes placing the
public on notice as to the limits of the patent, warning the public away
from the claimed technology, and demarcating the boundary between
infringing and noninfringing activity. Central claiming does not attempt to explicitly demarcate the boundary between infringing and
noninfringing activity. Rather, it leaves the determination regarding
infringement to adjudication, and so it may offer the public less advance warning about infringement than peripheral claiming seems to
offer. And if the practical effect of this uncertainty is opportunistic
litigation, either by patent plaintiffs who see an opportunity to reap
where they have not sown or by patent defendants who hope to avoid
infringement through minor changes, central claiming might be a
step backward for patent reform.
The simple answer to those who worry about the failure of public
notice under central claiming is that peripheral claiming has already
failed in that function, and in fact has failed catastrophically. Recent
patent cases are filled with examples of infringers who made reasonable assessments as to what was permissible under a patent’s claims
and were unpleasantly surprised to discover that sensible readings of
the claims gave no notice as to what a court would find to be infringement, much less what a party might claim a patent covers. It
seems no exaggeration to say that no one reading the average patent
claim can begin to guess what that claim may be held to cover; that
can only be known once the claims have been construed by a court in
a Markman hearing and, realistically, only after the Federal Circuit has
175

See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 15 (manuscript at 47).
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reviewed the findings of the district court judge conducting the
Markman hearing. The persistent and pervasive character of this failure suggests that it is not an anomaly that can be repaired but a systemic failure in a system that appears to be irretrievably broken. And
it is arguably responsible for the fact that in the industries with the
176
most patents, competitors simply don’t read those patents.
Additionally, public notice is possible under central claiming, if
perhaps by different means than have become accepted under peripheral claiming. We acknowledge that public notice is clearly an
important feature of patents, but claims are not the only possible way
to provide that notice. During the significant period of history in
which patents did not have claims, the notice function was instead fulfilled by meeting the requirement that the patentee specify and point
out what he claimed as his invention—a requirement that today would
177
be largely identified with the written-description requirement. And,
indeed, the written-description requirement continues to perform this
function to some extent under the current regime, even after claims
have become a recognized and required part of the patent docu178
In fact, there are some advantages to obtaining notice from
ment.
the written description rather than the claims, because the focus will
be on the actual invention and disclosure, not on after-the-fact efforts
to define what the patentee invented. And because the focus is on
that actual invention, central claiming gives its notice much earlier.
The public can learn what there is to know about the patented invention when the patent application is filed, not years later when claims
are actually approved or still later when continuation applications issue.
Because of the historical development of the statute, layering
claims upon written description, the division of “notice” between
claims and written description has been rather muddy as a matter of
patent doctrine. The two statutory requirements seem somewhat redundant, and this redudancy has led some commentators to question

176

See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 18, 21 (“[B]oth researchers and companies in component industries simply ignore patents. Virtually
everyone does it.”).
177
GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §§ 122, 130, 133 (2d ed. 1854).
178
E.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123 (2006);
Lefstin, supra note 83.
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how useful the written-description requirement remains.
We think
the inquiry can be turned around: if the written-description doctrine
can provide as much notice as claims do, it is open to question
180
whether we still need claims.
The lesson, then, is that notice does not necessarily require a
bright-line rule; in many instances, standards can provide enough notice. Indeed, bright-line rules will usually be contorted into standards
181
in actual practice. We have certainly seen that with patent claims.
Not only is the process of claim construction inherently indeterminate, as we have argued in Part I, but even efforts to create absolute
rules for particular common terms have failed. We had a “rule” that
claims using the phrase “means for doing x” were to be interpreted as
“means-plus-function” claims governed by special statutory rules of
182
construction, but over time that rule became a standard—a rebuttable presumption that use of particular language does or does not in183
And even that rebuttable presumption turns
voke section 112 ¶ 6.
out to be extraordinarily difficult to apply; one strains to find any distinctions at all in reading the Federal Circuit cases that do or do not
184
find a claim to be a means-plus-function claim. We insist on treating
the word “comprising” as signifying an open claim and “consisting of”
as signifying a closed claim—except when we don’t. Courts have refused to apply those terms as patent law defines them when the results

179

See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 55, 61 (2000); Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report From the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1649-52 (2007); Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the
Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222 (1998).
180
Cf. Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278, 290 (2008) (arguing that the increased enforcement of disclosure
doctrines is effectively driving patentees away from broad peripheral claims).
181
See supra note 12.
182
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
183
York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed.
Cir. 1996). Similarly, claims that don’t use the term “means” may nonetheless be
means-plus-function claims. See, e.g., Welker Bearing v. PhD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1096
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the phrase “mechanism for” presumptively invokes
means-plus-function claims).
184
Compare Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that “perforation means . . . for tearing” included structure and so was not a meansplus-function claim (omission in original)), with Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic
Prods. Int’l, Ltd., 157 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that “spring
means tending to keep the door closed” did not disclose structure and so was subject
to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6), abrogated on other grounds by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa,
Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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185

seemed absurd. Courts read the term “a” to mean “one or more”—
186
except when they don’t. The list goes on.
We are not arguing against judicial interpretation of patent language; as we have pointed out elsewhere, interpretation is a necessary,
187
inevitable, and even useful part of the judicial function. Indeed, we
expect some similar disputes over the meaning of the specification, as
courts already do in deciding how the specification might influence
188
The problem is, rather, the pretense
the meaning of the claims.
that the language on which the interpretation is based can or does
concretely define the outer boundary of the patent holder’s rights.
This is essentially an impossibility because patents describe not a
189
Central claiming
physical entity, but a set of legal entitlements.
avoids the problem, not by offering greater determinacy, but by avoiding the pretense that such determinacy is possible. The processes of
granting and enforcing exclusive rights common to all forms of IP require some determination as to the boundaries of the property with
which the rights are associated. Some interpretive act by an adjudicator is necessarily part of such determinations, whether they are made
as part of a determination of patent scope in central claiming or as
part of claim construction in a peripheral-claiming regime. Central
claiming sets a muddier standard that courts work out case by case ex
post; the virtue is that central claiming admits to being muddy instead
of pretending to be crystalline.

185

See, e.g., Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding that “consisting of” does not signify a closed claim where a defendant added
a spatula to a dental repair kit “consisting of” certain chemicals).
186
See, e.g., N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (holding that “linkage to a terminal portion” of a polysaccharide means linkage
to one and only one terminal portion); see also KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223
F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the word “a” generally means “one or
more” in open-ended claims). Chisum reports no fewer than seventeen Federal Circuit decisions construing the term “a.” DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENT LAW DIGEST
§§ 1529–1536 (2007).
187
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 18, at 104-08.
188
Compare Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010,
1018-19 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (relying on the specification in construing the definition of
“wound” narrowly), with id. at 1025 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (disputing the meaning of the
term “wound” as described in the specification).
189
As the CCPA noted in reviewing a PTO obviousness determination, “it is most
difficult, if not meaningless, to try to say what is or is not an obvious variation of a
claim. A claim is a group of words defining only the boundary of the patent monopoly. It may not describe any physical thing and indeed may encompass physical things
not yet dreamed of. How can it be obvious or not obvious to modify a legal boundary?” In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See Lefstin, supra note 83.
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The answer to the charge of indeterminacy leveled against central
claiming, then, is guilty. But peripheral claiming is guilty of indeterminacy too; indeed, it may be compounding the felony by falsely
promising precision that it cannot deliver. The indeterminacy of peripheral claiming is not something that can be fixed; it is inherent in
the disjunction between what is to be described and the language that
describes it. And if we can’t have bright-line rules in this case, we
might be better off striving for accurate standards rather than the mirage of unattainable clarity.
C. Half-Steps: Ending the Hegemony of Markman
Markman has remarkably quickly become the heart of almost every
patent lawsuit. Very few patent cases go to trial: 98% either settle or
190
are decided on summary judgment. And both settlement and summary judgment often depend critically on the outcome of claim con191
Peripheral claiming is even more firmly established;
struction.
Judge Rich, the author of the 1952 Patent Act, summed up its impor192
Eliminating
tance by saying “the name of the game is the claim.”
Markman and peripheral claiming would accordingly be a radical
change, one that would surely create temporary panic in the patent
bar and that might have consequences that are hard to foresee. We
are also mindful of the industry-specific character of patent claims,
which complicates the comparison of the costs and benefits of peripheral claiming. With that in mind, we offer in this Section some alternatives to a pure central-claiming system that might nonetheless improve on the flawed system of peripheral claims.
First, even if peripheral claims are not required, the law might
make them optional. Even before patent claims were required in the
nineteenth century, patentees sometimes provided those claims in an

190

According to a search conducted February 24, 2009, via Stanford IP Litigation
Clearinghouse, http://lexmachina.stanford.edu, 446 of the 24,307 patent cases filed
between 2008 and February 2009, or 1.8%, went to jury verdict. This number likely
understates the number of cases that went to trial, both because the denominator includes pending cases that might go to trial and because some patent cases, such as
pharmaceutical suits against generics, go to bench trial instead. But this number is
likely in the right range.
191
See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 17, at 958 (noting that Markman drives
summary judgments); Lemley & Walker, supra note 75 (investigating the relationship
between Markman and settlement).
192
Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).
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effort to delineate what they thought they had invented. As we have
seen, relying on claim language to define the boundaries of an invention often fails. But as we have written elsewhere, different industries
194
experience the patent system very differently, and there may be industries or technologies for which claims are quite clear expressions
of patent scope. A DNA sequence, for instance, tells someone who is
skilled in that art what is included and what is not; so too might a
195
definition of a chemical genus. If claims work for those inventions,
there is no reason that patentees shouldn’t be able to use them. A
patentee who set out voluntary claims would, in effect, be precommitting to a certain claimed patent scope, allowing examiners to evaluate
the prior art in view of the scope of the claimed patent and giving the
public and the courts notice of what the patentee considered her own.
But unlike modern mandatory, peripheral claiming, the voluntary
claim would not be an all-or-nothing proposition. A patentee who
overclaimed could not get broad protection without invalidating the
claim but could reasonably fall back on the narrower gist of the invention. Similarly, a patentee who made a mistake in claim language
would not be doomed by that mistake in the way it is today.
Second, even in a peripheral-claiming system, courts could pay
more attention than they do to the patentee’s actual invention and
the incremental contribution that it makes compared to the prior art.
Phillips was a step in the right direction here, emphasizing the patent
specification over dictionaries as a source of meaning for ambiguous
196
Dictionaries are one further step removed than claim
claim terms.
language from the actual invention; looking at what the patentee actually said and did, in understanding patent claims, will help refocus
patent analysis on inventions and not linguistic games. But more remains to be done. Courts should think expressly about the importance of an invention in defining its scope, either literally or through
the doctrine of equivalents. The now-moribund “pioneering patents”

193

See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
Compare BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 18 (manuscript at 142-55), with BURK &
LEMLEY, supra note 18 (manuscript at 156-65).
195
A particular type of patent claim, called a “Markush” claim, specifies components that can be combined. It takes the form X + Y + Z where X is selected from the
group A, B, C; Y is selected from the group D, E, F; and Z is selected from the group G,
H, I. See ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 50
(4th ed. 1996). Markush claims uniquely define a group by identifying all its members.
196
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
194
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doctrine could serve this purpose.
Courts should be willing in appropriate cases to disregard claim language that doesn’t seem to accurately capture what the patentee invented, rather than being prisoners
to that language even when it subverts the intent of the patent. Even
within a peripheral claiming system, the boundaries can be defined
with more or less precision, and courts should be willing to look to the
purpose of the invention and what distinguishes it from the prior art
to avoid giving words a meaning that subverts the true nature of the
patentee’s invention.
Finally, even if we are to define peripheral claims and construe
them in Markman hearings, courts need not construe every term in a
claim, or even every term about which the parties might disagree. A
surprisingly large number of claim-construction disputes turn out to
be unnecessary, in the sense that choosing one construction or another will not resolve the case. Other claim constructions are unlikely
to help a judge or jury understand the patent claim because they take
simple English words and replace them with more simple English

197

The Wright brothers, for example, won their patent-infringement suit against
Glenn Curtiss in 1914 because they were pioneering inventors, and the court accordingly afforded them broad protection even against the somewhat different Curtiss
plane. Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 211 F. 654, 655 (2d Cir. 1914). The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, the predecessor to the Federal Circuit, applied the pioneer-patent doctrine, see Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400 (C.C.P.A.
1967), and the Supreme Court continues to talk about patent scope under the doctrine of equivalents as a function of how pioneering the patent is. See WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4 (1997). To some extent
broadened claim scope follows naturally from the situation of a pioneering patent:
there is little prior art in a newly opened field that would prevent the inventor from
claiming broadly. Broad literal claims may not anticipate later-invented technologies
that could be substituted for elements of the claim, however; such substitutions may
instead be captured under the doctrine of equivalents, if applied broadly.
The pioneer-patent rule has not been invoked by the Federal Circuit in recent
years, leading some to consider it moribund. Compare Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar
Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that “pioneering inventions
deserve a broader range of equivalents”), with Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing,
Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that “the ‘pioneer’ is not a separate
class of invention”), overruled on other grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Federal Circuit did endorse the
pioneering-patent doctrine in an unpublished opinion in 2003. See Molten Metal
Equip. Innovations, Inc. v. Metaullics Sys. Co., 56 F. App’x 475, 480 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
And the doctrine provides at least one factor to consider in deciding how broadly to
apply the doctrine of equivalents. Some scholars have argued that it should play a
greater role in doctrine-of-equivalents cases than it does today. See, e.g., Michael J.
Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 2002-05 (2005); Thomas, supra note
13, at 58-59.
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words. Someone may have to decide what “about 6.0” means, but
there is little reason to think that defining the term “about” with other
words will advance that cause. Further, even some case-dispositive
constructions are case-dispositive not because they really resolve a legitimate question about the scope of a patent but because they focus
on a drafting error to cabin the patent in ways that the inventor did
198
not intend, or on a deliberate ambiguity to broaden the patent to
199
cover things the patentee did not invent. In those cases, claim construction serves as a trap for the unwary plaintiff or defendant, not as
a genuine effort to figure out what the patentee can rightfully claim to
have invented.
To solve this problem, we propose that claim construction be limited to terms that are (1) technical, and (2) the point of novelty. The
nominal purpose of claim construction is to help the jury understand
what the patent covers so that it can evaluate validity and infringement. It makes sense to explain to the jury the meaning of technical
terms—no jury can figure out whether the accused product contains
200
It doesn’t
“1,2-dichloroethylene” unless they know what that is.
make sense to explain to the jury what “when” means; claim construction here is being used not to clarify but to shape the meaning of the
patent claims and, hence, the scope of the invention. And if we are to
do that, we should be doing it only at the point of novelty. It may matter whether the inventor of a piston-pumped water gun claims to own
all air-pressure water guns or only those in which pressure is produced
by a piston; it should not matter where the water is located in the gun,
201
because that is not relevant to what the patentee actually invented.
202
“Point of novelty” as a concept has a bad reputation in patent law,
but that’s because the Federal Circuit fears that it will be used to treat
inventions as obvious on the basis of prior art that does not in fact

198

See supra note 168.
See supra note 169 (giving examples).
200
Nasty stuff. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH GUIDELINE FOR 1,2-DICHLOROETHYLENE,
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/healthguidelines/1_2-dichloroethylene/recognition.html
(last visited April 15, 2009).
201
These are, approximately, the facts of Larami Corp. v. Amron, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1280 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1993).
202
See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (rejecting a gist- or heart-of-the-invention concept in patent law). By contrast,
the test was routine in design-patent law until last year. See, e.g., Egyptian Goddess, Inc.
v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (rejecting the test).
199
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203

suggest the invention to the PHOSITA.
Courts should protect patent owners by focusing claim construction on what the patentee did
that is new, rather than using the need to describe old elements
204
Claim construction, in short,
somehow as a way to trip them up.
should be a last resort when the parties cannot agree on what the patentee invented, not routine and central to every piece of every patent
case.
CONCLUSION
Patent law is bogged down in the minutiae of claim construction,
largely because of the problems attending peripheral claims—that is,
claims that purport to set the outermost boundaries of patent rights.
Not only is the cost of such boundary setting becoming prohibitive,
the goal itself is illusory. Rather than relying on the illusion of peripheral “fence posts,” patent law may do better to once again look to
stability of central “sign posts.” Improvement could be made by
adopting hybrid measures, either in the process of moving from fenceposting to sign-posting or as improvements over the current system
that still stop short of fully adopting central claiming.
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See, e.g., W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1548.
We acknowledge that not every invention will have a “point of novelty” as such;
for many inventions, the novel feature is a unique combination of known elements.
But the fact that the point of novelty limitation won’t always work to cabin unnecessary
claim construction doesn’t mean it can’t be helpful in particular cases.
204

